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ABSTRACT
Proponents of the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity (DDS) have frequently argued
that God must lack any temporal, physical, or metaphysical composition on the grounds
that God’s existence would be dependent upon God’s parts. This avenue of discourse has
been tried and trod so often that most detractors of DDS find it insufficient to
demonstrate DDS. Additionally, objectors to DDS have often rejected the doctrine on the
count of the heap of metaphysical (often Aristotelian or Neoplatonist) assumptions that
one must make before one can even arrive at DDS. Within this essay I will offer an
argument for DDS that is advanced on the grounds of neither (1) arguing that a composite
God’s existence would be dependent upon its parts and must be rejected, nor (2) made
with a host of controversial metaphysical assumptions. I will presuppose modest
metaphysical commitments and argue for DDS on the grounds of creation ex nihilo. The
heart of my argument will be to (1) advance a historically informed conception of
creation ex nihilo, and (2) deduce that from such a notion of creation ex nihilo, that a God
who creates ex nihilo cannot be composite.

Divine Simplicity as a Necessary Condition for Affirming Creation ex Nihilo

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Graduate School of Theology
Abilene Christian University

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements of the Degree
Master of Arts
Theology

By
Chance Juliano
August 2019

To Rafael, Rita, Fred, Desiree, and Austin.
You each are necessary grounds for my completion of this project.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
There are several people that I would like to thank for their role in helping me
complete this project. First, I would like to thank my advisor, Frederick Aquino. His
thorough reading and critique of my work was incredibly helpful and I cannot overstate
my gratitude toward him for his help throughout this process. Furthermore, Dr. Aquino
has been a great mentor to me throughout my time here at ACU, and we have developed
an invaluable friendship along the way. I cannot thank him enough for the role he has
played in my academic life in particular and more broadly in my life as a whole.
Additionally, I would like to thank Dr. William J. Abraham and Dr. Matthew
Levering for their willingness to participate in this project. Their feedback in the early
stages was helpful and confirmed for me that this was a project worth pursuing.
Furthermore, the critical, yet kind, comments, queries, and objections that Dr. Abraham
and Dr. Levering provided at the thesis defense were helpful and informative. I am
immensely thankful for their role in this work.
I would also like to thank my good friend Austin McCoy for his role in this thesis.
Were it not for a conversation that he and I had while perusing the Catechism of the
Catholic Church, this project would have never come about. Additionally, I am grateful
for his willingness to play devil’s advocate and challenge my ideas as they were
developing in the earliest iterations of this work. Moreover, I would like to thank Austin
for his reading through parts of this thesis and offering helpful pushback for the first
major chapter.

Lastly, I would like to thank my wife, Desiree Sanabria, for supporting me
throughout this process. Her willingness to listen to me as I openly thought about new
ideas for the thesis was very helpful. Additionally, I cannot thank her enough that she
endured hours of me practicing for different conference presentations involving portions
of earlier drafts of this thesis. Further, I am so appreciative that she was willing, amid
some of my more anxious moments, to sacrifice her own time so that I could be at ease
and focus on finishing this project. She is a scholar in her own right, is my best friend,
and deserves far more praise than can be offered here. It is because of the help of all the
people here (and many more I have failed to mention but am, nevertheless, still grateful
toward) that I could complete this project.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1
Research Question ..................................................................................................1
Proposal...................................................................................................................1
Methodology ...........................................................................................................6
Chapters ..................................................................................................................7
Contribution to Scholarship ....................................................................................7

II.

GOD AS THE SOLE GROUND OF THE WORLD’S CREATION.....................9
Introduction .............................................................................................................9
Defining “Means” ................................................................................................. 10
The Problem with Non-Divine Means for Creation Ex Nihilo within the
Christian Tradition................................................................................................11
The Preclusion of Non-Divine Means as Necessary for Creation Ex Nihilo ........18
For God’s Act of Creation, All Grounds are Means ...............................................21
Supplemental Reasons for Holding God as the Sole Ground of the World’s
Creation .................................................................................................................26
Concluding Remarks.............................................................................................27

III.

A GOD COMPOSED OF PARTS CANNOT CREATE EX NIHILO .................30
Introduction ...........................................................................................................30
The Nature of Parts ...............................................................................................30
The Priority of Parts to Wholes in Existence and Action .....................................32

Objections ............................................................................................................40
Concluding Remarks............................................................................................50
IV.

THE SIMPLE GOD REIGNS: IMPLICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS ............51
Introduction ..........................................................................................................51
What is Entailed by DDS ?...................................................................................51
Contemporary Challenges to DDS.......................................................................56
Theological Implications of DDS ........................................................................71
Concluding Remarks............................................................................................74

V.

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................75
Summary ..............................................................................................................75
Areas for Additional Research .............................................................................76
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................78

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Research Question
What view of God follows from a historically informed definition of creation ex
nihilo? Creation ex nihilo is the notion that God creates the world (constituent parts and
all) out of nothing.1 Regarding creation ex nihilo, the Christian tradition has largely been
committed to the view that God does not make use of non-divine intermediaries when
creating the world. Behind this assumption, often lies a robust notion of divine aseity
and/or omnipotence.2 Thus, at the heart of creation ex nihilo seems to be a concern of
maintaining God’s role as the sole and sovereign creator of the universe. As my driving
question (stated above) indicates, I have an acute interest in determining what a
historically informed conception of creation ex nihilo entails about one’s conception of
God. In particular, what implications does creation ex nihilo hold for disputes concerning
the simplicity of God?
Proposal
The Doctrine of Divine Simplicity (henceforth, DDS) is the notion that God is not
composed of any physical, temporal, or metaphysical parts. DDS has recently drawn a

1. Ian A. McFarland, From Nothing: A Theology of Creation (Louisville, KY: Westminster John
Knox, 2014), 1.
2. McFarland (From Nothing, 94) argues that God uses nothing apart from God to create the
world. Also, Gerhard May notes that creation ex nihilo entails that God’s omnipotence is the sole ground of
the world’s creation. See Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of “Creation out of Nothing” in
Early Christian Thought, trans. A.S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), xi.
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substantial degree of criticism from analytic philosophers in particular.3 This thesis will
argue that a commitment to a historically informed definition of creation ex nihilo
necessarily entails a commitment to DDS.4 While most proponents of DDS have been
somewhat on the defensive in responding to recent criticisms, this work represents an
attempt to go on the offensive and offer an argument for DDS instead of merely
defending it from its critics. In terms of the structure, therefore, the thesis will have four
crucial features. First, I will present a formally valid logical argument for my conclusion.5
The argument that will be employed will run as follows:
1. If God’s creative action must be derived from something that is not-God, then
God cannot create ex nihilo
2. If God is composed of parts, then God’s creative action must be derived from
something that is not-God (i.e., from at least one of God’s parts)
3. God does create ex nihilo
4. Therefore, it is not the case that God’s creative action must be derived from
something that is not-God
5. Therefore, God is not composed of parts.
The validity of the argument above can be demonstrated by showing that both of
the inferences are valid. In variable form, the argument runs as follows:
1. D ⊃ ¬X
2. C ⊃ D

3. For example, see Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature: The Aquinas Lecture, 1980
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980).
4. I would like to thank Austin McCoy for helping me articulate my claim.
5. This argument is inspired by a similar argument from the blog of Alexander Pruss: “Divine
Simplicity and Aristotelian Metaphysics,” Alexander Pruss's Blog, 28 February 2010,
http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2010/02/divine-simplicity-and-aristotelian.html.
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3. X (or ¬ ¬X)
4. ∴ ¬D (from 1 and 3)
5. ∴ ¬C (from 2 and 4)
Here, D stands in for “God’s creative actions must be derived from something that
is not-God,” X stands in for “God creates ex nihilo,” and C stands in for “God composed
of parts.” The inference of premise 4 from 1 and 3 is a form of modus tollens involving
double negation.6 It is the logical equivalent to the following inference:
1. If there is a void, then no thing can be moved7
2. It is not the case that no thing can be moved
3. Therefore, there is no void
Additionally, the inference to premise 5 from 2 and 4 is a plain example of modus tollens.
Taken in isolation it will look as such:
1. C ⊃ D
2. ¬D
3. ∴ ¬C
Thus, it can be seen that the argument I will present in this thesis is logically valid. By
implication, then, the argument must be objected to on the grounds concerning the
plausibility of its premises and not its validity. Since my argument is aimed at those who
are already sympathetic to creation ex nihilo, premise 3 will be presupposed. Thus, my
thesis will largely be devoted to defending premises 1 and 2.

6. See Robert M. Johnson, A Logic Book: Fundamentals of Reasoning, 3rd ed. (New York:
Wadsworth, 1999), 188.
7. Ibid., 160.
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To this end, my second objective will be to advance the claim that a doctrine
creation ex nihilo that is informed by the Christian tradition and its assumptions
concerning the doctrine (mentioned above) must hold that God is the only ground for the
creation of the world.8 From this, premise 1 follows. Third, I will argue that all views of
God that stipulate God as having real parts will entail that God is not the only ground for
the creation of the world. This entails the truth of premise 2. From this, with the
assumption that the world is created ex nihilo, follows my claim that God must be simple.
Fourth, having already addressed some objections to my argument in particular, I will
address some relevant objections to divine simplicity generally.
This argument will differ from traditional arguments for DDS in two ways. First,
it will not draw directly from the doctrine of divine aseity. The standard line of argument
in favor of divine simplicity is to infer the doctrine from divine aseity.9 In this respect,
classical theists maintain that the doctrine of divine aseity necessarily entails DDS. The
traditional rationale for the doctrine of divine simplicity is that if God is composed of
parts (of any kind, be they temporal, physical, or ontological), then this would imply that
God’s existence is contingent upon something more fundamental (or “absolute”) than
God. This has been the rationale that has been advanced by thinkers both within and
outside of the Christian tradition. The ancient Neoplatonist Plotinus, for example, held
that the One (his ontological ground of being) must be utterly and absolutely non-

8. Additionally, while some Christian thinkers (e.g., Aquinas) have held that creation ex nihilo is
compatible with an eternal universe, this thesis will not rule on the matter. For our purposes, we will
assume that God creates the universe in the sense that it has an absolute beginning.
9. Alvin Plantinga concedes as much in Does God have a Nature (28–9).
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composite.10 This is because a composite presupposes (and is dependent upon) the
existence of its parts.11 Thomas Aquinas has a similar rationale when he notes that if God
is composed of parts, since God cannot be predicated of any one of God’s parts, then
God’s parts would not be fully God.12 This would entail that some aspect of God is not
fully divine.13 Contemporary classical theists advance a similar line of argument. All of
these lines of argumentation are informed by the doctrine of divine aseity. As Katherin
Rogers notes,
In order to be perfect God must not depend for His existence on anything
else. He must exist absolutely a se, from Himself. But if we posit that God
has properties of (for example) wisdom, power and goodness, and indeed
must have them in order to exist as God, but we hold that these are not
identical with Him, then are we not forced to the conclusion that God’s
existence is dependent upon things other than Himself?14
This classical theistic line of reasoning concerning the contingency of ontological
composites will prove to be indirectly informative to this thesis. The thinkers that will be
most operative within this thesis will be Plotinus and Thomas Aquinas. While this thesis
will make use of these sources, my argument will only subtly be informed by such
thinkers while applying their same concerns to divine creative action rather than aseity. In

10. Paul L. Gavrilyuk, “Plotinus on Divine Simplicity” (lecture presented at the Divine Simplicity
Conference, Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL, 19 March 2015), 5, https://www.academia.edu/10063215/
Plotinus_on_Divine_Simplicity_paper_presented_at_the_Divine_Simplicity_Conference_Wheaton_Colleg
e_Wheaton_IL_March_19_2015.
11. Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus, ed. Ted Honderich, Arguments of the Philosophers (New York:
Routledge, 1994), 7.
12. Matthew Levering, Engaging the Doctrine of Creation: Cosmos, Creatures, and the Wise and
Good Creator (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017), 96.
13. Ibid, 96.
14. Katherin A. Rogers, Perfect Being Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000),
25.
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contrast to the traditional manner of arguing for DDS on grounds of divine aseity, I hope
to show that DDS follows from a historically informed conception of creation ex nihilo.
Second, robust metaphysical commitments often employed by classical theists
(e.g., Aristotelian-Thomist assumptions about the world) are not necessary to advance the
claim of this argument. While some classical theists, broadly speaking, and Thomists,
particularly speaking, have made arguments for divine simplicity from such metaphysical
commitments, this argument will be slightly different insofar as it will not make use of
robust Platonic/Aristotelian metaphysics that many classical views have and that it will
emphasize that divine creative action (rather than existence) must be derived from God
and God alone. Thus, my argument will not hinge on the assumptions of the real
distinction of act/potency or essence/existence.15 While my proposal will be loosely
informed by classical theists, it will not be necessary to buy into the metaphysical
commitments of these writers for the argument to succeed.
Methodology
This thesis will employ insights from history and analytic philosophy. With
regards to history, it will be important to establish the presence of a vein within Christian
theology that affirms that creation ex nihilo entails that God must not make use of any
non-divine means in his creative actions. After establishing the historical precedence of
this assumption the thesis will take a philosophical turn. The primary task of this thesis
will be to philosophically demonstrate the necessity of divine simplicity entailed by the
constraints of the established historical assumptions. Since this argument is intended to
show that DDS can be demonstrated without appeals to Aristotelian or Neoplatonic

15. That is not to say that such distinctions may not be possible implications of my argument or
that my argument does not lend itself to support such real distinctions.
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concepts, I will draw primarily from recent work in analytic metaphysics, with a
particular focus on the notion of grounds, and mereology. The language of “parts”
employed within the formal argument will convey the same meaning as “proper parts”
within the field of mereology. Of paramount concern will be the relation of proper parts
to wholes in the actions of beings.16
Chapters
Within this first chapter, I have sought to establish my research question, lay out
my proposal, summarize my methodology, and highlight how I hope this work might
contribute to scholarship. The second chapter of this thesis will attempt to demonstrate
the plausibility of the first premise of my argument by offering a historically informed
conception of creation ex nihilo and employing the metaphysical concept of grounds. My
third chapter will argue that a God composed of parts cannot create ex nihilo and, thus,
establish the truth of my second premise. Since this argument is aimed at those who
already hold to creation ex nihilo, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer an
argument for creation ex nihilo. As such, creation ex nihilo will be assumed for our
purposes. Within my fourth chapter, I will address the implications and objections to
DDS, generally. And, lastly, I will summarize my overall argument while mentioning
some areas for further research within my concluding chapter.
Contribution to Scholarship
This thesis will contribute to scholarship in three related ways. First, it offers an
alternative avenue for classical theists to use when arguing for divine simplicity. Second,

16. While my argument is at least peripherally concerned with divine action, perhaps my focus on
“God’s creative action” would be more aptly characterized as broadly focused on the grounds for the
creation event and God’s creative capacities.
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this argument will present new challenges for detractors of DDS. This thesis is inspired
by a similar argument by Alexander Pruss.17 But, unlike Pruss, this argument is not as
much concerned with what God creates, so much as with how God creates.18 If God does
create anything ex nihilo, then certain necessary conditions must be met for that act to be
a bona fide instance of creation ex nihilo. Third, my argument will offer a uniquely
Christian take on why the only form of realism concerning properties, essences, divine
ideas, and abstract objects would be one that is couched in DDS. This is because all
realist positions about properties, essences, etc. will undermine the doctrine of creation ex
nihilo. The only way for a Christian committed to a historically informed conception of
creation ex nihilo who wishes to avoid DDS, then, would be to take up an extreme form
of nominalism.

17. Pruss, “Divine Simplicity and Aristotelian Metaphysics.”
18. One of the premises within Pruss’s argument states that “God creates everything other than
God.” My argument relies on a slightly different premise (premise 1). The argument within this thesis is
dependent upon certain conditions that must apply if God creates anything ex nihilo. It will be beyond the
scope of this thesis to actually demonstrate that God does create anything ex nihilo. Thus, this argument is
intended to appeal to those who would already accept the doctrine of creation ex nihilo and the assumptions
held by the Christian tradition concerning the doctrine.
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CHAPTER II
GOD AS THE SOLE GROUND OF THE WORLD’S CREATION
Introduction
In this chapter, I will argue that a necessary condition for creation ex nihilo is that
God’s creative capacities must be wholly underived. This chapter will be divided into a
major and minor section. Within the major section I will offer an argument for why
God’s creative action must be wholly underived. This follows from two reasons: First, if
God creates ex nihilo, then the means by which God creates cannot be something that is
not divine. This can be demonstrated from a historically informed conception of creation
ex nihilo. There is a prominent vein present within the Christian tradition that attests to
the truth of this premise. Second, if God’s creative action must be grounded/derived from
something that is not-God, then the means by which God creates must be something that
is not divine. From this, the first premise of the overall argument follows: If God’s
creative action must be derived from something that is not-God, then God cannot create
ex nihilo. Within the minor section of this chapter, I will offer some supplemental reasons
for holding to the truth of the argument’s first premise. In particular, I will argue that if
one is interested in maintaining a conception of creation ex nihilo that does not contradict
other traditional divine attributes (e.g., aseity and sovereignty), then one has reason to
accept the argument’s first premise. Each of these sections, taken cumulatively, bolster
the plausibility of the first premise.
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Defining “Means”
Before venturing into what the Christian tradition has to say about God’s use of
means in creation ex nihilo, it is important to note how I am defining the notion of
“means.” For the purpose of this thesis, I will take the inspiration for my definition of
“means” from Ron Highfield.1 By “means” I am simply referring to what Highfield calls
“the how” concerning an agent’s actions.2 Highfield notes that if he tells the reader that
he lifted a car “six inches off the driveway to change a tire,” one will presume that he
employed a certain means.3 In other words, a means is (in part) what enables/grounds an
agent’s actions.4 Additionally, I hold that a means is something that must be employed by
an intentional agent with control over their actions.5 Thus, when I use a knife to cut a
cantaloupe, while I may/may not have direct control over the knife (my control is,
presumably, mediated through my hands), I am still acting as an agent when employing
the knife as a means. Additionally, I am intentionally defining means broadly. Depending
on the action in question, a means could be an external instrument, a limb, or even one’s
whole self. This is mostly for heuristic purposes, given that my chief concern with means
is “the how” concerning an agent’s actions.6 Thus, a means is something that grounds an
agent’s action that the agent intentionally employs. This is important because grounds

1. Ron Highfield, The Faithful Creator: Affirming Creation and Providence in an Age of Anxiety
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2015), 82–3.
2. Ibid., 82–3.
3. Ibid, 83.
4. There will be a more thorough discussion of grounds later in the chapter.
5. George Wilson and Samuel Shpall, “Action,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward
N. Zalta, 2016, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/action/.
6. Thus, my intention is not to offer some formalized theory of instruments or tools, for example.
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and means ought not to be seen as symmetrical concepts, but rather, distinct ones.
Additionally, grounds need not be actively employed by agents, whereas means must be.
For example, the fact that it is raining outside might be a partial ground for my fetching
an umbrella, but it is not a means of my fetching the umbrella. Thus, the manner in which
an agent’s actions might be grounded is often passive (e.g., the rain is a ground for my
fetching the umbrella). But means are things that are in the control of the agent and that
are actively employed by the agent (be it direct/indirect or immediate/mediate control).
For example, when I swing a baseball bat to hit a high and tight fastball, the bat is a
grounds of my action, but it is also a means of my action. It is important to keep this
distinction between grounds and means in mind as more will be said on this later in the
chapter.
The Problem with Non-Divine Means for Creation Ex Nihilo
within the Christian Tradition
Having unpacked what is meant by “means,” I can now illustrate that a
historically informed conception of creation ex nihilo holds that God does not create the
world via non-divine means. By this, of course, I do not mean that the whole of the
Christian tradition attests to this, but, rather, that there is a strong vein within the
Christian tradition that holds what is at least tantamount to this view. Additionally, my
goal will not be to accurately exegete every jot and tittle of what these few witnesses
said. Rather, my focus will be merely to show there is a significant line of Christian
thinkers who have been committed to the idea that God’s creation of the world ex nihilo
precludes God’s use of non-divine means. This will mitigate the risk that my argument is
ad hoc or self-serving. It is to such a historical task, that I now turn.
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Despite the fact that there were some Christian thinkers who held that God did
make use of non-divine means in creating the world, we eventually see the rise of a
theological trajectory that is bound to reject such conceptions of creation.7 The student of
Justin Martyr, Tatian, was the first major Christian thinker to have held that God not only
created the world, but also created the matter from which the world was formed.8 Tatian
asserted that matter itself was created from God and God alone and “through no other.”9
Furthermore, Tatian saw God to be the creator of not only matter, but also the forms
themselves.10 As Craig notes, “Tatian rejected the notion that there is besides God any
eternal, uncreated thing, even pure forms.”11 What lies at the heart of Tatian’s rejecting
God’s use of non-divine means is the motivation that God is the sole unoriginate reality.12
The second-century Christian thinker, Irenaeus, takes a sharply distinct trajectory
from earlier Christian thinkers who held that God created the world out of some primary
matter. Irenaeus held that when God created the world, he did not stand in need of any
intermediaries.13 God did not need to make use of any angel in order to create the world,

7. For instance, Justin Martyr held that God could have made use of primal matter to create all the
cosmos. See Jaroslav Pelikan, “Creation and Causality in the History of Christian Thought,” JR 40.4
(1960): 246–55.
8. Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of “Creation out of Nothing” in Early Christian
Thought, trans. A.S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 150.
9. Ibid., 151.
10. William Lane Craig, God over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016), 35.
11. Ibid., 35.
12. From this point forward I will be employing “means” and “non-divine means”
interchangeably, unless otherwise specified.
13. Denis Edwards, Christian Understandings of Creation: The Historical Trajectory, Christian
Understandings Series (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017), 30.
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for example.14 Irenaeus rejects both God’s use of some non-divine means in creating the
world as well as God’s creating some first intermediary that God subsequently used to
create the world.15 This is not to insinuate that Irenaeus held that God did not make use of
any means in creating the world. Irenaeus seems to have been committed to the idea that
God makes use of the Word and Spirit in a manner that is at least analogous to a means.
In fact, Irenaeus depicts the Word and Spirit within the Triune life of God as the two
“hands” that God uses to create the world.16 Thus, Irenaeus is not opposed to God’s use
of any means, but he is opposed to any non-divine means. Irenaeus was committed to the
notion that all creatures owed their entire existence to God’s creative act.17
Another Christian thinker who was committed to the notion of creation ex nihilo
was the third-century thinker, Tertullian of Carthage. Clifford states that within his
Treatise Against Hermogenes, Tertullian notes that God’s creation of the world must
stem from either (1) God’s creation out of himself, or (2) God’s creation out of nothing,
or (3) God’s creation of the world out of some pre-existing matter.18 Tertullian rejects (1)
and (3) in favor of a view in which God creates the world ex nihilo. For Tertullian, if God
were to create the world outside of some kind of matter, then matter would be superior to
God; but this is obviously objectionable. Therefore, God must not create the world with
matter.19 Additionally, Tertullian notes that if God would have made the world out of
14. Edwards, Christian Understandings of Creation, 30.
15. Ibid., 30.
16. Ibid., 32–33.
17. Ibid., 31.
18. Anne M. Clifford, “Creation,” in Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives, ed.
Francis S. Fiorenza and John P. Galvin (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2011), 216.
19. Ibid., 216.
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matter, then the Scriptures would have indicated as much.20 Since, however, they do not,
we have reason to hold that God did not make use of matter in creating the world. Thus,
we see that for Tertullian, God’s use of means (in particular, material intermediaries) is
something that is precluded under creation ex nihilo.
Within Athanasius’s Discourse Against the Arians, we see a rationale for rejecting
God’s use of non-divine means. Athanasius writes:
You said that He made for Himself His Son out of nothing, as an instrument
whereby to make the universe. Which then is superior, that which needs or that
which supplies the need? Or does not each supply the deficiency of the other?
You rather prove the weakness of the Maker, if He had not power of Himself to
make the universe, but provided for Himself an instrument from without, as a
carpenter might do or shipwright, unable to work anything without adze and saw!
Can anything be more irreligious?21
We see Athanasius rejecting God’s use of an intermediary on the grounds that this would
imply a deficiency of God’s power. For Athanasius, God stands in no need of anything in
addition to himself in order to create. God’s power alone is sufficient to create the
cosmos.
Augustine of Hippo also held that God did not make use of means in creating the
world. Augustine noted that should the world have been created from the very substance
of God, then it would have an equal ontological status to the eternally begotten Son of
God (given that the Son is homoousios with the Father).22 But, alternatively, if God’s
creation of the world was aided by something that God did not create, then God would

20. Clifford, “Creation,” 216.
21. Athanasius, Discourses Against the Arians 1.7.26 (NPNF2 4), http://www.newadvent.org/
fathers/28161.htm.
22. Clifford, “Creation,” 218.
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not be almighty.23 Additionally, for Augustine God alone is the one who creates ex
nihilo.24 While mothers and fathers are creators in some sense, according to Augustine,
because they derive their creative powers from God, they are not true creators.25 Thus,
for Augustine God’s role as the ultimate first cause precluded the possibility of any other
creator. Additionally, God’s causal role necessitates that God did not make use of means
in his act of creating.
Anselm of Canterbury is another prominent representative of the Christian
tradition who rejected the possibility of God’s creating via some intermediary in creation.
Anselm argues, “Therefore the supreme essence cannot have made anything through
something else (i.e., using it as a tool or assistant)—it can only have acted through
itself.”26 Thus, at least within the Monologion, Anselm seems committed to the idea that
God could not have made use of any instrument or “assistant” within his creation of the
world. The divine essence presupposes nothing in addition to it in order to create the
world.
Lastly, within the thought and writings of Thomas Aquinas as well, God’s use of
means is precluded in God’s creation of the world ex nihilo. For Aquinas, it belongs to
God and God alone to give being to creatures.27 Aquinas notes that since creation
presupposes nothing, then this nullifies the necessity of God’s use of instruments in

23. Clifford, “Creation,” 218.
24. Trin. 3.9.16.
25. Trin. 3.9.16.
26. Anselm, Monologion, 7.
27. ST 1.45.5.
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creation.28 If God’s creative action did presuppose something then God would not be the
creator of that thing.29 Thus, for Aquinas, God is the universal creator of the world. On
the one hand, God does not make use of any instruments in creation and, on the other
hand, God is the ultimate foundation for all of reality. In describing Aquinas’s position on
the matter, Tanner notes, “in God’s case there are no materials; God’s creation of the
world presupposes nothing prior to it, upon which God works. And there are no tools, no
means. Indeed, God creates the world without any intervening process at all,
immediately. The rejection of creation on or by way of anything requires all such
modification.”30 Thus it is clear that for Aquinas God does not make use of any means in
creation ex nihilo.
A quick note ought to be made about Aquinas’s conception of creation ex nihilo
and divine ideas. Aquinas is committed to the notion that creation ex nihilo precludes
God’s use of intermediaries in creation. But how is this to be reconciled to the concept of
divine ideas? It seems that for Aquinas, if divine ideas were something truly separate
from God existing alongside God, then they could plausibly be a means of God in
creation. Levering acknowledges the potential threat posed by divine ideas and the feat of
creation ex nihilo. Levering asks, “Does Aquinas’s doctrine of the divine ideas reduce the
living God’s creative work to the production of a mere copy of a deterministic divine

28. ST 1.45.5.
29. ST 1.45.2.
30. Kathryn Tanner, “The Foolishness and Wisdom of All God’s Ways: The Case of Creation Ex
Nihilo,” in The Wisdom and Foolishness of God: First Corinthians 1–2 in Theological Exploration, ed.
Christophe Chalamet and Hans-Christoph Askani (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2015), 281–2.

16

template?”31 Levering, in summarizing Aquinas’s position and the broad trajectory of
Thomistic thinking on the relationship between divine ideas and creation ex nihilo,
answers in the negative. For Levering, divine ideas are a threat to creation ex nihilo if,
and only if, they are something that is impersonal and distinct from God.32 However, the
Thomistic tradition has broadly resisted such a characterization. As Gilson and Ross
argue, Aquinas’s position is that the object of God’s knowledge is, in fact, simply God
himself.33 This does seem to reflect Aquinas’s own thinking on the matter. For Aquinas,
God’s knowledge of the divine ideas does not necessitate many “images” within the mind
of God, but only one: the divine essence and the many ways in which it can be imitated.34
As Panchuk qualifies, while God knows the many ways in which the divine essence can
be imitated, the object of God’s knowledge is God.35 Thus we can see that for Aquinas, a
commitment to a realist conception of divine ideas does not conflict with his view that
God must not make use of any means in creating the world ex nihilo.
From what has been shown here, each of these witnesses from the Christian
tradition at least hold that God’s creative act is not grounded in something that is not-God
that God actively employs to create. But this is the very definition of means I offered
above. Thus, we see strong representation within the Christian tradition of the view that

31. Matthew Levering, Engaging the Doctrine of Creation: Cosmos, Creatures, and the Wise and
Good Creator (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017), 53–4.
32. Ibid., 56.
33. Ibid., 56.
34. ST 1. 15. 2.
35. Michelle Panchuk, “The Simplicity of Divine Ideas” (unpublished paper), 16,
https://www.academia.edu/30372564/The_Simplicity_of_Divine_Ideas, 16.
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creation ex nihilo precludes what I have dubbed non-divine means.36 It is worth noting
that non-divine means is an important distinction to maintain. This is because there are
some Christian thinkers (e.g., Irenaeus) who maintain that God makes use of divine
means (i.e., the Son and the Spirit) in creating the world. So, while it is plausible that God
may create the world ex nihilo by use of divine means, God’s use of non-divine means is
not compatible with creation ex nihilo. Thus, one committed to a historically informed
conception of creation ex nihilo, especially one that is informed by the (largely western)
sources mentioned here, has reason to hold that, if God creates ex nihilo, then the means
by which God creates cannot be something that is not divine
The Preclusion of Non-Divine Means as Necessary for Creation Ex Nihilo
There is further reason to preclude non-divine means from a historically informed
account of creation ex nihilo. If it were the case that God could make use of non-divine
means in creation ex nihilo, then it seems that the only two conditions that would be
necessary for creation ex nihilo would be (1) that the world that God created did not
previously exist, and (2) that God created the world, constituent parts and all.37 I suggest
that, in light of the sources examined here, a third condition is necessary: (3) God does
not create the world through any non-divine means. However, perhaps I’ve made my case
too hastily. Is it possible that one might reject (3) in favor of a more modest proposal?
36. Note that my positing that the Christian tradition precludes God's use of non-divine means is a
much more modest assertion than stating that the Christian tradition precludes God's use of non-divine
grounds. It is much easier to show the presence of the former than the latter within the Christian tradition.
In fact, if my assertion were that God's creation of the world precludes non-divine grounds, then the
exegetical burden of proof would be greater. It seems that all of the witnesses here are, at the very least,
stating that God does not actively employ something that is not-God in his creation of the world. This then
makes my overall task of showing that, for God, all grounds must be means, a primarily philosophical,
rather than exegetical, task.
37. Both of these mentioned conditions are at least necessary because things are created which
previously didn’t exist all the time (e.g., houses, babies, and works of art). But these hardly seem to amount
to bona fide instances of creation ex nihilo.
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Need all non-divine means be rejected? One might reject (3) in favor of a view in which
creation ex nihilo merely necessitates that God does not create the world out of/through
matter. But this does not accord well with the sources surveyed here. For example, this
would entail that God could make use of non-divine immaterial means. As we have seen
from our survey of the Christian tradition, conceptions of creation ex nihilo have often
precluded such a possibility. For instance, the second-century Christian thinker, Tatian,
held that God created even the immaterial forms (and, thus, did not make use of them in
creation).38 Furthermore, as was noted with Athanasius, contra the Arians who posited
that Christ (whose pre-incarnate nature is immaterial) was created by God to help create
the world, God does not stand in need of any immaterial means to create the world. In
fact, for Athanasius, if God does stand in need of some means (even immaterial and
personal ones, like the Arian conception of Christ), then this would imply that God stands
in need of an instrument in much the same way a carpenter stands in need of a saw.39
Additionally, as we saw with Irenaeus, God does not make use of any angels (which are
immaterial creatures) in his act of creation.40 If creation ex nihilo merely precluded
material means, then God’s use of immaterial means, such as the ones mentioned here,
would be compatible with creation ex nihilo. Given that there is a strong vein within the
Christian tradition that precludes such means from their account of creation ex nihilo, a
historically informed account of creation ex nihilo ought to also preclude such means.

38. William Lane Craig, God over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016), 35.
39. Athanasius, Discourses Against the Arians 1.7.26 (NPNF2 4), http://www.newadvent.org/
fathers/28161.htm.
40. Edwards, Christian Understandings of Creation, 30.
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Thus, what constitutes a thing (be it material or immaterial) is not ultimately what is
problematic about God’s use of means.
Additionally, one might be tempted to hold, as an alternative to (3), that creation
ex nihilo must preclude God’s use of external means. But this is not without its
problematic implications for creation ex nihilo. For example, by merely precluding
external means, one fails to include legitimately problematic internal means. If divine
ideas are real and distinct from God, then, to reiterate Levering’s point, God’s act of
creation is reduced to simply copying a pre-existing divine template.41 This would seem
to diminish God’s creative capacities in much the same way God’s simply molding
primordial matter would reduce God’s creative capacities. Because divine ideas are held
to exist within the mind of God, such a conception of divine ideas seems to show that
there are plausible instances of God’s making use of internal means in creating the world.
Thus, merely precluding God’s use of external means is not sufficient to avoid a
problematic conception of creation ex nihilo. The proximity of a certain means in relation
to God is, therefore, not ultimately what is problematic about God’s use of means for an
account of creation ex nihilo.
Moreover, if one rejected (3) in favor of a view that merely precludes God’s use
of contingent means in creation ex nihilo, this would not go far enough. One can think of
means that God might make use of that are not contingent that would be problematic for
an account of creation ex nihilo. If, for example, abstract objects are real and distinct
from God, then they would be necessarily existent.42 And if God’s creative actions must

41. Levering, Engaging the Doctrine of Creation, 53–4.
42. Unless one is an absolute creationist, but this poses its own problems. See, Craig, God over
All, 43.
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depend on such abstract objects, then this would seem to diminish creation ex nihilo in
much the same way that God’s use of matter or divine ideas would. Thus, the problematic
nature of non-divine means cannot be explained by the contingency of the means
employed by God.
My assertion is that the problematic nature of non-divine means stems from the
fact that they are non-divine. What such a non-divine means would be made up of, its
“location” external/internal to God, or its modal status is irrelevant to creation ex nihilo if
it either (a) is not a means for God’s creation or (b) is itself divine.43 Thus, it seems
plausible to hold that what is problematic about non-divine means for creation ex nihilo is
that they ground God’s creative action and, more obviously, they lack divinity.44 What
makes means problematic, then, is not what they are per se, but what they are not: God.
Therefore, a historically informed conception of creation ex nihilo ought in principle to
preclude God’s use of any non-divine means in his act of creation.
For God’s Act of Creation, All Grounds are Means
The second reason we have for holding to premise 1 of the primary argument of
this thesis is that if God’s creative action must be grounded/derived from something that
is not-God, then the means by which God creates must be something that is not divine. In
order to illustrate this point, it is necessary to unpack in more detail the notion of
grounds. Loosely, a “ground” is something that metaphysically determines/entails or

43. One could reject the existence of such entities due to other traditional divine attributes (e.g.,
aseity), but such entities, if they are causally irrelevant to God’s creative action, are not problematic for
one’s conception of creation ex nihilo.
44. If they didn’t ground God’s creative act, they would be irrelevant to his act of creation.
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makes true something else.45 As Fine explains, the notion of grounds stems from the idea
that some propositions/truths/events hold “in virtue of” others.46 Additionally, there is a
distinction between a full and partial ground.47 A full ground is a ground that is sufficient
to entail some fact/event, while a partial ground is one that is, in and of itself, insufficient
but still contributory to the truth of a given fact/event.48 To repeat a previously used
example, imagine cutting a cantaloupe with a kitchen knife. The kitchen knife will serve
as a partial ground for one’s cutting of the cantaloupe.49 While grounds often entail
counterfactual dependence, this need not be the case.50 Even if one might have been able
to cut the cantaloupe without this particular kitchen knife (e.g., just any other kitchen
knife would do the job), this specific instance of cutting the cantaloupe is still grounded
in this particular kitchen knife. Broadly, then, grounds are what, at least in part, explain
why/how it is that something else holds.
What, then, is the relation between a ground and what I have called a means?
First, it must be pointed out that all means must be (at least partial) grounds for the agents
employing them. Allow me to illustrate with a comedic example: Imagine with me a
wizard, we’ll name him Dübendorf, who can allegedly create a toad ex nihilo. Now, if

45. Ricki Bliss and Kelly Trogdon, “Metaphysical Grounding,” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2016, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/grounding/.
46. Kit Fine, “A Guide to Ground,” in Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of
Reality, ed. Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 37.
47. Alastair Wilson, “Metaphysical Causation,” Nous 52.4 (2018): 726.
48. Ibid., 726.
49. Grounds need not necessarily be thought of as being related, strictly, to things such as
facts/events; I am only employing this language here as an example. Grounds can refer to any thing that
entails some thing else or any thing that holds in virtue of something else.
50. Sungho Choi explains: “[an] event c counterfactually depends on the event e if, without c, e
would not have occurred.” See “Causation and Counterfactual Dependence,” Erkenntnis 67 (2007): 1.
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when we observe Dübendorf performing the alleged act of creation ex nihilo, we notice
him waving a wand and a toad—atoms, webbed feet, and all—subsequently coming into
being we might be tempted to think this a bona fide instance of creation ex nihilo. But,
not so fast! It is clear from the illustration that Dübendorf must make use of some
intermediary or means which is distinct from himself in order to create the toad (i.e., the
wand)! But Dübendorf’s wand must, in some sense and to some extent, ground his
creative action. That is, Dübendorf’s wand is, in part, what explains how the toad comes
into being. This will be true of any intermediary/means. This is because, if a means were
totally causally irrelevant to an agent’s action, then the agent could not, in any sense, be
understood to employ such a means. It could not constitute a means in any sense. If
Dübendorf does not, in any way, use his wand, then his wand cannot be a means of his
action. The same is true with any action. If a would-be means in no way grounds the
action of a given agent, then it is unclear how this could be conceived of as a means.
Thus, all means must be grounds for the agents employing them.
But, notice that the title of this section states that, at least in reference to God, all
grounds are means. But do we have reason to think that the relationship between grounds
and means is a symmetrical one? Just because all means are grounds does not necessarily
entail that all grounds are means. In fact, we have prima facie evidence indicating the
opposite! First, remember the illustration of the distinction between the rain as grounds
and the bat hitting the ball as a means. Grounds need not be active, whereas means (as I
have used the term) must necessarily be employed actively. Allow me to use an
additional illustration. Imagine that as his day job Dübendorf works at a major law firm.
When Dübendorf arrives at his office he receives word that he has gotten a promotion on
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account of his consistently arriving to work on time. Now, consider the fact that
Dübendorf’s office lies on the fiftieth floor of the building and he must regularly take an
elevator to his office. Now, if the elevator would have been faulty on the morning of
Dübendorf’s promotion, he would have been late and the promotion may very well have
been revoked. Thus, the elevator’s functioning properly is a partial ground for
Dübendorf’s receiving his promotion. But, the elevator seems to hardly constitute a
means that Dübendorf uses to receive his promotion. Sure, Dübendorf might have some
control over which buttons he might press on the elevator, for example, but he has no
control over the elevator’s overall functioning. While Dübendorf’s use of the wand in the
prior example is a clear instance of using a means, Dübendorf’s use of the elevator is not.
The elevator’s proper functioning is not, in any meaningful way, in Dübendorf’s control.
Dübendorf’s use of the wand is active, whereas the elevator’s being a partial ground for
his promotion is passive. We have reason to hold that not all grounds are means.51 Thus,
there is reason to be skeptical of my assertion that if God’s creative action is grounded in
something that is not-God, then God must employ a non-divine means.
While it is true that the vast majority of human experience would indicate that not
all grounds are means, I would like to suggest that for God, all grounds related to God’s
creation of the world must be means. There are three reasons for thinking this. First, if
God is omniscient, then God is aware of every facet of what happens when he is creating
the world. Thus, God must not be ignorant of the grounds that ground his creative
actions. Second, if God is sovereign, then God is in control of whatever grounds

51. I have no interest here in holding that all grounds are means in general. If, however, all
grounds are means, then my argument would be strengthened.
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ultimately give rise to the world. Third, in light of divine freedom, God is not compelled
to create the world. Creation ex nihilo is partly predicated on the rejection of the
emanationist or fatalist conceptions of the world.52 God’s act of creation is an utterly free
and sovereign act. Thus, in light of the fact that God is aware of all of the grounds that
are individually necessary and collectively sufficient to bring about the cosmos that he
wishes to create prior to his act of creation (logically speaking), and given that God is not
compelled to create the cosmos, God must actively employ all of the grounds necessary
to create the cosmos. God, out of his utter freedom and sovereignty, must actively choose
to utilize the grounds necessary to create the world. This would entail that all of the
things that ground God’s creative action must be actively employed by God. But this,
precisely, is the definition of means I sketched out earlier. Thus, at least for God’s
creative act, anything that grounds God’s creative action must be a means used by God.
God’s creative capacity in no way passively depends on some more fundamental
principle. Rather, in light of divine omniscience, sovereignty, and freedom, God is aware
of and in absolute control of the grounds necessary to create the world and must
volitionally employ them to bring the world about. Whatever grounds are necessary to
bring about the world, then, must be actively employed by God as means.
But, if God’s creative action must be grounded in something that is not-God, and
if—as I have argued here—all grounds of God’s creative action must be employed as
means by God, then God must make use of (at least some) non-divine means to create the
world. But this, coupled with our rationale from earlier that God must not make use of
non-divine means to create the world ex nihilo, entails the truth of the first premise of my

52. Highfield, The Faithful Creator, 134.
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overall argument: If God’s creative action is derived from something that is not-God,
then God cannot create ex nihilo. In light of this, we have good reason for accepting
premise 1. Thus, God must be the sole ground of the world.
Supplemental Reasons for Holding God as the Sole Ground of the World’s Creation
As noted in the introduction, there are supplemental reasons for holding that God
as the sole ground of the world’s creation is a necessary condition for creation ex nihilo.
Any conception of creation ex nihilo that entails that God is not the sole ground of the
world will not be compatible with divine sovereignty and aseity. The doctrine of divine
aseity holds that God exists independently of everything else.53 Additionally, the doctrine
of divine aseity traditionally holds that God is the only being that exists a se.54 But if,
contrary to premise 1, God’s creative actions must be derived from something that is notGod, then God would not exclusively exist a se. This is because, if when God creates the
cosmos, God’s creative act would be derived from something that is not-God, then this
would seem to imply that that something, that is not itself God, existed a se.
Furthermore, if God is not the sole ground of the world’s creation, then God
would not be sovereign over the world. Divine sovereignty has often been couched in
terms of all things being such as they are because God has willed them to be such as they
are.55 But if something that God did not create partially grounds the creation of the world,

53. Craig, God over All, 1.
54. Ibid., 1.
55. I have purposefully defined “sovereignty” broadly here. I do not need the hypermonergist/compatibilist view to be true for my critique to hold. It is perfectly compatible with softer views
of sovereignty (e.g., molinism). See, Vincent Bacote, “John Calvin on Sovereignty,” in The Sovereignty of
God Debate, ed. D. Stephen Long and George Kalantzis (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2009), 62; William
E. Mann, “Divine Sovereignty and Aseity,” in The Oxford Handbook to Philosophy of Religion, ed.
William J. Wainwright (Oxford: Oxford University, 2005), 35-58; Kenneth L. Pearce, “Counterpossible
Dependence and the Efficacy of the Divine Will,” Faith and Philosophy vol. 34 (2017): 3-16.
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then there is something that is prior (at least logically) to the divine will. In such a case
the world’s coming into being would not be due exclusively to the sovereign will of God
but, rather, would presuppose something that is not itself God. God’s will would not be
intrinsically efficacious or sovereign but would presuppose something that is not divine
and extrinsic to the divine will. Attempts to salvage divine sovereignty by noting how
even such non-divine grounds are themselves under the sovereignty of God would not
undermine my claim pertaining to sovereignty. This is because all that is required for
divine sovereignty to be undermined (and all my argument as a whole implies) is that
something that is not-God and is itself not created by/dependent upon God grounds God’s
creative will. Since, then, as has already been stated, I have no interest within this paper
to offer a conception of creation ex nihilo that is at odds with traditional divine attributes,
any conception of God’s creation of the world in which God’s creative actions must be
grounded in something that is not-God ought to be rejected.
Concluding Remarks
Within this chapter I have argued that if God’s creative action must in any way be
grounded in something that is not-God, then God cannot create ex nihilo. This follows
from two reasons: First, a historically informed conception of creation ex nihilo entails
that if God creates ex nihilo, then the means by which God creates must be divine. There
is a strong cumulative case from the Christian tradition that would bolster this view.
Second, if God’s creative act is grounded (even partially) in something that is not-God,
then God must use some non-divine means to create the world. This is because, while the
relationship between what I have dubbed “means” and grounds usually need not be
symmetrical, for at least God’s creative act, however, all grounds must be means. This
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follows from a robust view of divine omniscience, sovereignty, and freedom.
Additionally, there are supplemental considerations that would also lend support to the
plausibility of premise 1. Namely, if God’s creative action must be derived from
something that is not-God, then this would risk undermining divine sovereignty and
aseity. These reasons, while independently compelling, when taken together give us a
strong cumulative case for the plausibility of premise 1.
What follows then is that God is the very means by which he creates.56 Or, as
Highfield puts it, “God is his own ‘how.’”57 This argument implies that, since for God’s
creative act all grounds must be means and since God cannot make use of non-divine
means in creating the world, God must be the sole ground of the world’s creation. God,
and God alone, is what brings about the world. This spells trouble for any realist position
of properties, essences, abstract objects, etc., that would entail that God’s creative action
would be grounded in such things. If such things exist as entities really distinct from God
prior to God’s act of creation, then God is necessarily bound to derive his creative
capacities from them. Thus, any realist view of properties, essences, or abstract objects
that holds that such things really exist prior to creation entails that God must derive God’s
creative capacities from such entities. But from what has been argued here, we have
reason to hold that God’s creative act can in no way be grounded in anything that is notGod. Thus, we ought to reject realist positions on things like properties, essences, and

56. Implicit within this conclusion is the assumption that God is, at the very least, something like
an agent. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer any exhaustive account of divine agency, since my
primary concern here is exploring what grounds the creation event and God’s creative capacities.
Regardless of whatever implications DDS bears on a theory of divine agency, it seems that if, at worst, God
is not an agent, this would only be because concepts of agency would imply an imperfection in God and
could by no means diminish the divine nature.
57. Highfield, The Faithful Creator, 82, n. 15.
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abstract objects because they would undermine creation ex nihilo. God alone is the
ground for the creation of the world. This seems to be an important aspect of what the
doctrine of creation ex nihilo is seeking to preserve. No primordial muck, nor angel, nor
abstract object grounds (even in a partial way) the world’s coming into being. Rather,
creation ex nihilo necessitates a cosmogony with God alone at its source.
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CHAPTER III
A GOD COMPOSED OF PARTS CANNOT CREATE EX NIHILO
Introduction
Within the previous chapter, I argued that a necessary condition for affirming
creation ex nihilo is that God cannot derive his action from something that is not-God.
Within this chapter, I will argue that a God composed of parts must derive its creative
actions from something that is not-God. In order to demonstrate this, I will address three
issues. First, I will define precisely what is meant by the word “part.” Second, I will
argue that, in an analogous way to how parts are often argued to be prior to wholes in
existence, at least some parts must be prior to wholes in action. In other words, in order
for composite beings to act, their actions must depend on (at least one of) their parts.
Third, I will argue that if God is composed of parts, and if what I’ve argued about actions
depending on parts is true, then a God composed of parts must derive its creative actions
from something that is not God. From this, it follows that a God composed of parts
cannot create ex nihilo. Furthermore, if this is the case, then the overall argument of the
thesis follows: In order for God to be capable of creating ex nihilo, God must be simple
(i.e., non-composite). I will then close this chapter with some concluding remarks.
The Nature of Parts
Premise 2 within the overall argument states that if God has proper parts, then
something that is not God, at least one of God’s proper parts, is a necessary condition for
God to act. It is necessary to unpack precisely what is meant by this premise. If God is
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composite in a real sense, then God has proper parts. It is important for the purposes of
this thesis to have a working definition of “part” and “proper part” respectively. First,
“informally … object X is a part of object Y if and only if X is a component of Y, or X is
contained in Y, or Y presupposes X, or X is one of the objects that Y is composed of.”1
Secondly, in contrast, “object X is a proper part of an object Y if and only if X is a part
of Y and Y is not a part of X” (emphasis mine).2 In other words, a part need not be
distinct from a whole, whereas something is a proper part if it is an aspect of a thing
without being identical to that thing.3 Thus, if God is really composite (that is, not merely
conceptually composite), then God is composed of actually distinct proper parts.
Within classical doctrines of God, parts within the divine life would be
constituted by anything that implies composition. For example, for Thomas Aquinas, a
composition of act/potency or essence/existence would constitute composition within the
divine life. Since, within this thesis, I am not committed to pushing any particular
Aristotelian or Neoplatonic metaphysic, I will abstain, for the moment, from committing
to the idea that a distinction of act/potency or essence/existence (and the like) constitute
real parts. Rather, if my argument within this chapter succeeds, then it will follow that if
essence/existence or act/potency (or any other thing within the divine life) entails that
God is composed of parts, then that would entail that God would be incapable of creating
ex nihilo. Thus, premise 2 within the argument holds that if God is composed of any real
proper parts, then God’s creative action must be derived from something that is not-God.

1. Roy T. Cook, “Parthood.” Dictionary of Philosophical Logic (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2009), 216.
2. Ibid., “Proper Parthood,” 231.
3. I will be utilizing the terms “part” and “proper part” interchangeably.
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The Priority of Parts to Wholes in Existence and Action
The question arises, then, even if God has proper parts, why should we think that
one of those parts is necessary for God to perform creative actions? It is at this point in
the argument that Plotinus’s conception of composition and contingency is useful. For
Plotinus, anything that is composed must be contingent upon its parts. In describing the
One, Plotinus notes, “Untouched by multiplicity, it will be wholly self-sufficing, an
absolute First, whereas any not-first demands its earlier, and any non-simplex needs the
simplicities within itself as the very foundations of its composite existence.”4 For
Plotinus, a composite is posterior (at least logically) to its parts. In offering an illustration
of the contingency of wholes upon their parts, Feser writes, “For the whole cannot exist
unless the parts exist and are combined in the right way. For example, if there were no
chair legs, no frame, or no seat, the chair would not exist.”5 Feser goes on to note that this
contingency is not simply the byproduct of being contingent upon chronologically prior
events, “[even] if a certain chair had always existed, it would still be true that its
existence presupposes that its parts exist and are put together in the right way.”6 A
composite presupposes the existence of its parts. As Gavrilyuk notes in describing
Plotinus’s notion of composition implying contingency, “Non-simple things are
composed, and composed things ontologically depend on their parts in the sense that if a

4. Enn. 5.4.1.
5. Edward Feser, Five Proofs of the Existence of God (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2017), 69.
6. Ibid., 74.
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part is removed, the thing is no longer what it used to be.”7 The existence of a composite
thing, then, is wrapped up in the existence of its respective parts.
Since, however, my argument is not aimed at demonstrating that a composite
God’s existence must be derived from its parts, but rather, that a composite God’s
creative actions must be derived from its parts, we must now apply Plotinus’s thoughts
on parts to God’s creative action. If a being is composed of parts, then for that being to
act it will need to make use of (at least) one of its parts. Thus, its ability to act is derived
from at least one of its proper parts. For instance, Dübendorf is undoubtedly composed of
body parts. If Dübendorf decides to go for a jog one morning, then his action must
necessarily presuppose at least one (probably more) of his parts. Dübendorf will not be
able to jog if he does not have a heart, for example. Thus, at least one of Dübendorf’s
parts is necessary for him to act. Dübendorf’s ability to run, then, is dependent upon the
existence and functionality of his heart. In other words, Dübendorf’s capacity to run is
grounded in (at least) one of his parts. This does not entail that Dübendorf necessarily
needs all of his parts to act (after all, he could run even if he tragically lost his hand while
practicing magic). However, there is at least one of Dübendorf’s parts that is necessary
for him to act. One of Dübendorf’s parts must ground his capacity to act. This is because
it would be inexplicable that any being composed of parts could act wholly independently
of its parts.
The same can be said of God. If God is composed of proper parts, then the fact
that God is capable of creating the world is true in virtue of (at least) one of his parts. In

7. Paul L. Gavrilyuk, “Plotinus on Divine Simplicity” (lecture presented at the Divine Simplicity
Conference, Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL, 19 March 2015), 4, https://www.academia.edu/10063215/
Plotinus_on_Divine_Simplicity_paper_presented_at_the_Divine_Simplicity_Conference_Wheaton_Colleg
e_Wheaton_IL_March_19_2015.
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other words, at least one of God’s parts is what (in part) explains why God has the
capacity to create the world. But this is, precisely, what the grounding relation is! Even if
it is the case that God doesn’t use all of God’s parts to create the world, God must make
use of at least one of God’s parts to create the world. Since a composite cannot act wholly
independently of its parts, there must be some part of God that serves (at least partially)
as a ground for God’s creative act. This is because without said part (or parts) God would
be unable to perform the act in question (i.e., creating the world) or would simply cease
to exist because the absence of that part would preclude the possibility of God’s
existence. In either case, God’s ability to perform an action would be derived from God’s
parts. It seems that to avoid stating that God’s creative actions are in some way derived
from (at least) one of God’s parts, one must either say that God is simple or that God, as a
composite, can act wholly independently of God’s parts. But since the latter is incoherent,
the only possible alternative to denying that God’s creative action is derived from (at
least) one of God’s parts is to say that God is simple.8
But, perhaps I’ve made a category error. Sure, the language of grounds is helpful
when we speak of counterfactuals. After all, it really is true Dübendorf’s capacity to go
jogging is grounded in some of his parts (e.g., his heart) because without such parts
Dübendorf would not be able to perform the action in question (i.e., go for a jog). But
God is traditionally understood to be a necessarily existent being. By extension, then, if
God is composed of proper parts, then God’s parts would each be necessarily existent.
But if this is the case does the language of grounds become useless? We cannot speak of

8. Of course, one could maintain that God’s creative action might be grounded in one (or more) of
God’s parts; but, as will be seen, we have reason for rejecting such a position.
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counterfactuals in reference to God’s necessarily existent parts. Sure, if God did lack a
given part, then God would not be able to create ex nihilo. But if God exists necessarily,
then the antecedent of the aforementioned statement is necessarily impossible. We cannot
even speak of a possible “world” in which God lacks a given part.9 However, we can
speak of explanations of certain things even when such things are necessarily the case.10
As Leftow notes, “There may be a reason why P even if there are no alternatives to its
being the case that P.”11 Or, as Leftow also states, “One can say why P rather than Q
partly by saying why it is impossible that Q” (emphasis original).12 Thus, for Leftow, it is
possible that one might explain necessary things.
Leftow goes on to list several cases in which necessary facts can depend on
others. Dependence need not necessitate causation. As we’ve already seen in Plotinus,
many hold that composites presuppose the existence of their constitutive parts.13 Leftow
uses the example of a wall composed of red bricks to illustrate that the redness of the

9. It is worth noting that there is some dispute within the literature as to whether we can
meaningfully speak of impossible worlds. Davidson notes, contra Lewis’s thoughts on possible world
semantics, that there are examples of counterfactuals of impossible states of affairs that are not merely
trivially true. Davidson offers the following statement, “If an omniscient being knew no mathematics, he
would fail calculus,” to show that there are at least some plausible statements about impossible worlds that
may be true in a nontrivial fashion. Furthermore, not all counterfactuals in impossible circumstances would
be trivially true; for example, the statement “If an omniscient being knew no mathematics, he’d do well in
calculus” seems to be false. Thus it seems possible that we can speak of counterpossibles in a way that is
not trivially true.
Vander Laan, among others, have proposed that language of “impossible worlds” helps make
sense of counterpossible statements. See, Matthew Davidson, “God and Other Necessary Beings,” Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2015, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/
god-necessary-being/.
10. Brian Leftow, God and Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 504.
11. Ibid., 504.
12. Ibid., 504.
13. Ibid., 505.
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bricks does not necessarily cause the wall to be red but nevertheless explains the redness
of the wall.14 Leftow states, “Even if both wall and parts existed necessarily, the parts’
redness would explain the whole’s, and the whole’s would depend on its parts’, not vice
versa” (emphasis original).15 Leftow also points to things such as sets to illustrate how
necessary truths can depend on others. While 2+2=4 is necessarily true, Leftow notes, the
truth of 2+2=4 still presupposes the truth of its constituent members.16 In other words,
even necessarily existent sets must presuppose the reality of their constituent particulars.
We can think of other plausible instances of real dependence among modally necessary
things. Imagine, for instance, a book sitting atop a coffee table.17 Even if, for whatever
reason, the book and the coffee table necessarily existed, surely it is still the case that the
book really depends on the coffee table to remain aloft in every possible world. Thus, the
language of dependence seems to be a broader category than mere counterfactual
dependence. For Leftow, the language of dependence is to be understood as “beingfrom.”18 This would help solve difficulties of causation when counterfactual dependence
does not seem to do the trick.
A popular criticism of David Lewis’s language of causation as counterfactual
dependence often involves pointing out that there are plausible counterexamples of

14. Leftow, God and Necessity, 505.
15. Ibid., 505.
16. Ibid., 505.
17. This illustration of dependence is loosely inspired by C.S. Lewis’s comments on begetting
within his Mere Christianity and Edward Feser’s illustration of act/potency. See, C. S. Lewis, Mere
Christianity: A Revised and Amplified Edition (New York: Harper Collins, 1980), 173-4; Feser, Five Proofs
of the Existence of God, 17ff.
18. Leftow, God and Necessity, 508.
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causation that do not involve counterfactual dependence. For example, “Suppose that
along with Billy, Suzy threw her rock at the window at almost the same time. Then the
counterfactual ‘If Billy had not thrown his rock, the window would not have shattered’ is
false.”19 But if, as Leftow contends, “being-from” is an ontological category that would
contain all instances of causation while also being a broader category than causation, this
would explain how Billy could be understood to be a genuine cause of the window’s
shattering even when the event does not counterfactually depend on his action. In other
words, while the window’s shattering would not counterfactually depend on Billy’s
throwing the rock, the action itself would be from Billy’s throwing of the rock.20 Hence,
the lack of counterfactual dependence need not necessitate the lack of any real
dependence. Thus, it would seem that even among necessary things, there can be
dependence. Hence, the objection against my argument here that the language of
grounding makes no sense when speaking of necessary existing entities (e.g., God’s
parts) does not succeed given that real dependence does not require modal dependence.
It follows, then, that if God is composed of parts, then God’s creative actions must
be derived from (at least one of ) God’s parts. This is true even if God’s parts are
necessarily existent because, as we have seen, there can be real dependence among
necessarily existent entities. In a similar manner to how a necessarily existing book must
really depend on a necessarily existing coffee table to be held aloft, so too would God’s
creative capacity really depend on at least one (if not more) of God’s parts. Thus, if God

19. Sara Bernstein, “Lewis’s Theories of Causation and Their Influence,” in The Cambridge
History of Philosophy, 1945–2015, ed. Kelly Becker and Iain D. Thomson (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, Forthcoming).
20. I take Leftow’s language of “being from” to be synonymous with how I have employed the
term “ground.”
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is composed of parts, then there is real dependence of God’s creative action upon (at
least) one of God’s parts (even if both God and God’s parts are necessarily existent). The
only way to avoid such a conclusion would be to posit that God is simple.
But, what is the problem with avoiding simplicity by positing that God’s creative
actions are derived from one of God’s necessarily existing parts? What is ultimately lost
under such a view? Well, as premise 2 in the main argument states, a God composed of
parts must derive its creative action from something that is not-God. This can be shown
via identity or predication. First, if God is composed of parts, then God is distinct from
any one of God’s parts. But, Leibniz’s law concerning the identity of indiscernibles
states, “if x and y are distinct then there is at least one property that x has and y does not,
or vice versa.”21 If God has parts, however, then God must not be identical to any one of
his parts (i.e., they must not share every property). If God were identical with any one of
God’s parts, then such a part (or parts) wouldn’t actually be a proper part at all. Thus, if
God’s creative action is derived from a part of God, then such action would be derived
from something that is not-God, at least in terms of identity. This is because God and the
part that God derives God’s creative action from are distinct, and thus God would derive
God’s creative action from something distinct from God.
Even if identity would be too strong of an “is” to employ here, the same is true in
terms of predication. To predicate of a thing that “X is God,” X would need to exemplify
or instantiate the essential properties of God.22 Or, as Thomas Senor puts it, if we take

21. Peter Forrest, “The Identity of Indiscernibles,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 31 July
1996, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/.
22. See Kevin Mulligan, “Predication,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward
Craig (New York: Routledge, 1998), 7: 665-6.
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divinity to be a “kind” of which things can instantiate, then it must (at least) be “a
collection of properties that are essential for anything to count as divine.”23 But if God’s
creative action is (even partially) grounded in one of God’s parts, then God’s creative
action would be derived from something that does not exemplify what it means to be
God. This is because each of God’s parts do not, in and of themselves, exemplify what it
means to be God (i.e., they do not possess all of the essential attributes of divinity). God’s
power, for instance, does not possess all of the essential properties of divinity
(omniscience or omnibenevolence, for example). In other words, it would be wrong to
predicate of God’s power that “God’s power is God.” Thus, if God’s power is really
distinct from God, then God’s creative action would be grounded in something that is
not-God. God’s power is not-God in terms of identity and predication. The same applies
to any proper part of God.
Allow me to make use of another example. If God’s creative power is derived
from God’s parts A, B, and C, then each of the parts (taken individually) ground (at least
partially) God’s creative power. That is, any one of the parts contributes, in an
incomplete way, to God’s having the capacity to create. But part A does not exemplify
what it means to be God. Thus, God’s creative action would be derived from something
that is not-God.
Since, then, a composite God’s creative action must be grounded in something
that is not-God (either in terms of identity or predication), and creation ex nihilo
necessitates that, if God creates ex nihilo, then God does not derive its action from
something that is not-God, it follows that a God composed of parts cannot create ex

23. Thomas D. Senor, “God Supernatural Kinds, and the Incarnation,” RelS 27.3 (1991): 355.
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nihilo. Therefore, if one seeks to maintain a traditional conception of creation ex nihilo,
then they have good reason to reject the view that God is composed of parts.
Objections
Before exploring any additional implications of what has been argued for here, it
is necessary to address some lingering questions and objections. First, premise 2 of the
argument offered within this thesis states that a God composed of parts must derive its
creative action from something that is not-God. But could this be avoided by postulating
that a composite God’s creative action might be grounded in all of its parts? If this were
the case, since the sum of God’s parts is God himself, then God’s creative action would
be derived from God. However, this objection misunderstands one of the primary points
emphasized in the argument. Even if God made use of all of God’s parts to create the
world, it would still be true that God must derive God’s creative action from each of the
parts. So, even if God is, say, composed of parts A, B, C, and D, and God uses A, B, C,
and D to create, God’s creative action would be derived from each part, A, B, C, and D,
individually. Even if, for example, God’s creative capacities are not counterfactually
dependent upon A, B, C, and D, if God does make use of A, B, C, and D, to create the
world, then God’s creation of the world would be grounded in each part. Each part, in
part, helps explain God’s creation of the world. To harken back to an example from the
last chapter: if I do not need a particular kitchen knife to cut a cantaloupe, if just any
kitchen knife would do, and I still use a given kitchen knife, then that kitchen knife still
grounds this particular instance of my cutting of the cantaloupe. Thus, if God uses all of
God’s parts to create the world, then each of God’s parts, taken individually, partially
grounds God’s creation of the world. And given that none of God’s parts, individually,
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exemplify the essence of divinity, then God’s creative action would still be derived from
something that is not-God. In fact, the problem would only be multiplied by such an
alternative. If God makes use of parts A, B, C, and D to create the world instead of just
part A, for example, then, since none of the parts themselves exemplify divinity, God’s
creative action would be grounded in four non-divine entities instead of one! This is not
to deny that God would still create the world, but, rather, that God’s creation of the world
would be grounded in something that is not-God. To use another illustration: suppose that
I lift a box by using muscles in my legs and (unadvisedly) in my back. Additionally,
suppose that I am strong enough to lift the box by using my legs. The use of my back
muscles would be unnecessary to lift the box, but my back muscles would still,
nevertheless, partially ground my lifting of the box. But my back muscles are not me.
Back muscles do not possess all of the essential characteristics that I do. Hence, my
lifting of the box would be (partially) derived from something that is really not-me. It
would still be true that I lifted the box, but it would not be true that I lifted the box in an
underived manner. While my lifting of the box was not counterfactually dependent upon
my back muscles, my back muscles would still partially ground my action. The same is
true of God. This is because it would still be true that, even if God made use of all of
God’s parts to create the world, any one of God’s parts, which are not themselves God,
would still ground God’s creative action. Thus, just positing that God makes use of all of
God’s parts to create the world does not negate the fact that God’s creative action would
be grounded in something that is not-God.
But what if we could posit that the parts that ground God’s creative action do
exemplify divinity? The Christian tradition offers a potential solution with universal
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appeal: the Trinity. Could it be the case that the Triune persons of God, which themselves
might be conceived of as proper parts of God, ground God’s creative activity? If this is
the case, then premise 2 would be false. We would have a conceivable instance in which
a composite God’s creative actions would not be derived from something that is not-God.
God’s creative actions would be derived from God and God alone! Unfortunately, there
are a handful of problems with this objection.
First, and perhaps, most importantly, the persons of the Trinity were not
historically understood to be proper parts of God. As Ayres notes, the pro-Nicene
Christians themselves were committed to the notion that God is wholly non-composite
and without parts.24 In fact, Ayres states that one of the major dilemmas of Nicaea was
maintaining an irreducible threeness of the Triune persons while not violating divine
simplicity.25 Thus, given that a historically informed conception of the Trinity does not
conceive of the Triune persons as proper parts of God, those interested in maintaining a
Trinitarian theology in line with a Nicene trajectory would have reason not to posit that
the Triune persons are proper parts of God.
Second, even without such historical considerations, a conception of the Triune
persons as proper parts of God suffers from plenty of problems on its own. For example,
ought we to consider the property of “being triune” to be an essential attribute of

24. Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 281. This is not, of course, to say that all of the pro-Nicene
Christians agreed about all that a denial of parts in God implied about God and God’s attributes.
Nevertheless, Ayres notes, such a commitment to simplicity clearly shaped the theology of Pro-Nicene
Christians.
25. Ibid., 281.
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divinity?26 Or, as Leftow puts it, is the Trinity an additional “case” of divinity?”27 If
being Triune is an essential attribute of divinity, and if the Triune persons are proper parts
of God, then neither the Father, the Son, nor the Holy Spirit ought to be considered God,
because they do not possess this essential attribute. God the Father, for example, is not
Triune, but rather, a person of the Trinity. Thus, if being Triune is an essential attribute of
God and the Triune persons are proper parts of God, then one must deny the divinity of
the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. If, on the other hand, being Triune is not an
essential attribute of divinity, then God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit would all
exemplify divinity but would, in and of themselves, possess all of the essential attributes
of divinity. If the Triune persons are really distinct, and being Triune is not an essential
attribute of divinity, then there would be three instances of divinity. But this then would
lead to tritheism! Thus, a conception of the Triune persons as proper parts of God seems
to face the inevitable pitfalls of either tritheism or denying the divinity of the Triune
persons. Both options are unacceptable for one informed by a historical conception of the
Triune persons.
Third, even if the Triune persons (as proper parts of God) can ground God’s
creative action without falling prey to the objections listed above, there are still additional
problems. If the Triune persons themselves are composed of parts, then the force of the
argument laid out here remains intact. The only way to escape such a conclusion would

26. My comments here are inspired by Brian Leftow’s objections to social trinitarianism in his
“Anti Social Trinitarianism” and Dale Tuggy’s critiques of Trinitarianism, broadly. See, Brian Leftow,
“Anti Social Trinitarianism,” in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, ed. Stephen T.
Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 203–50; Dale
Tuggy, “Steve Hays Fails to Rebut the Charge of Tritheism,” Trinities: Theories about Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit, 25 May 2018, https://trinities.org/blog/steve-hays-fails-to-rebut-the-charge-of-tritheism/.
27. Leftow, “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” 221.
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be to hold that the Triune persons themselves are simple entities. What would be required
by such a position would be to deny any form of composition in God other than the
Trinity. But this would seem problematic given that it would likely face many of the
same sorts of objections that DDS already faces (e.g., is there no real distinction between
God’s other attributes?). While I find the first two objections against attempts to ground
God’s creative action in the Triune persons to be forceful, even if one evades those and
maintains that the Trinitarian persons are themselves simple entities, this is not without
its problems. Thus, attempts to ground God’s creative act in the Triune persons as proper
parts are not fruitful.
Alternatively, but in a similar and more narrow vein as the attempt to ground
God’s creative action in the Triune persons, what if God’s creative action was grounded
in exactly one essential part? While this might sound odd, consider the following
counterfactuals. In possible world 1, God makes use of one of God’s essential parts to
create the world and a plurality of God’s accidental parts. By the logic of the argument of
this chapter, such a God would not be capable of creating ex nihilo. This would be
because God’s accidental parts, taken individually, are not-God by identity or
predication. But now imagine possible world 2, in which the creative action of the same
God from possible world 1 is now grounded only in God’s one essential part. Are we
supposed to believe that simply because God would make use of some accidental parts in
possible world 1 but has the same capacities as God in possible world 2 that he does not
create ex nihilo? There are a few responses to this question.
First, if creation ex nihilo does, in fact, preclude the possibility of God deriving
God’s creative capacities from something that is not-God, then if God’s creative action

44

were (in any way) grounded in something that is not-God, such an action would not be an
act of creation ex nihilo. So, yes, a God that makes use of accidental parts to create the
world does not create ex nihilo. Even if such a God has the capacity to create ex nihilo
and chooses not to, such an act would not be an act of creation ex nihilo in much the same
way that if God could have created ex nihilo but chose to make use of matter, such an act
would not be an act of creation ex nihilo.
Second, the only way God’s creative action could be grounded in exactly one
essential part as possible world 2 indicates would be if God has one essential part. Since
essential parts are (a) necessary to the existence of a being and may also (b) be used by a
being to perform an action, then if one were to remove any essential part from a being—
even one that is not immediately used in a given action—then that being could not
perform any action. Thus, any action that a being performs must (at least) presuppose the
existence of each of that being’s essential parts. Dübendorf cannot jog without his mind,
even though jogging for Dübendorf is a menial and nigh-mindless activity. Therefore, all
actions depend on (at least) each of a being’s essential parts. If God is composed of a
plurality of essential parts, then God’s creative action must (at least) be derived from
each of God’s essential parts. Hence, the only way God’s creative action could be derived
from one essential part would be if God only had one essential part. Furthermore, as was
noted with the Trinitarian objection above, if one holds that God is composed of only one
essential part, then this would likely fall prey to objections often levied against DDS.
God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and goodness all seem to be essential, and yet distinct,
attributes of God. Yet if God has only one essential attribute, then these would all need to
be the same. But this is one significant problem that critics of DDS have with the
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doctrine. Thus, efforts to avoid DDS by positing a view that falls prey to the same
objections that are levied against DDS does not seem to be a fruitful path. Worse still,
one could pick which of the traditional divine attributes is the essential attribute of God
and hold the rest to be accidental. The problem with this solution is that it would leave a
great many attributes that are traditionally thought to be essential to God (e.g.,
omnipotence, goodness, omnibenevolence, aseity—take your pick!) as accidental. Since
the only way to hold that God’s creative capacities are grounded in only one of God’s
essential parts must necessarily lead to positing that God has only one essential part, and
since this would be unacceptable to critics of DDS, such an alternative should be rejected.
Another potential objection to what has been argued for here is inspired by
William Lane Craig’s thoughts on the Trinity.28 In some of his works on the Trinity, in an
effort to defend his robust account of social Trinitarianism, Craig asks whether it is
possible for a thing to be divine in more than one way. Craig and Moreland use the
illustration of proper parts of a cat and the category of felinity.29 “One way of being feline
is to exemplify the nature of a cat. But there are other ways to be feline as well. A cat’s
DNA or skeleton is feline, even if neither is a cat. Nor is this a sort of downgraded or
attenuated felinity: a cat’s skeleton is fully and unambiguously feline.”30 For Craig, the
felinity of the cat’s spine is derived from the fact that such a thing is a proper part of the
28. It should be noted that Craig himself doesn’t levy this objection against DDS or any argument
that is even remotely similar to what is offered here. This is merely a hypothetical objection of which Craig
offers a similar variation in discussions of the Trinity. I am changing it slightly and applying it to my
argument. See, William L. Craig and J. P. Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for A Christian Worldview
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 590; William L. Craig, “A Formulation and Defense of the
Doctrine of the Trinity,” Reasonable Faith, https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-writings/
christian-doctrines/a-formulation-and-defense-of-the-doctrine-of-the-trinity/.
29. Craig and Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 591.
30. Ibid., 591.
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cat.31 Craig goes on to apply such logic to his conception of the Triune persons. But, for
our purposes, let us apply it to my argument. Sure, if something is not identical to God or
does not have all of the essential divine attributes, it is a sort of not-God thing. But, a la
Craig, what if we just expanded the category of divinity to refer to a part of a divine
being? And, subsequently, we might have good reason to think that a God composed of
parts is not deriving its creative action from something that is not-God in any sense. This
alternative is not without its own problems, however.
First, as Tuggy has pointed out, it is misleading to suggest that a feline skeleton
and a cat are both feline in the same sense.32 It doesn’t seem that we can, in good faith,
say that a proper part of God is divine if it doesn’t have the essential attributes of divinity.
Or, as Vallicella states, since we clearly do not mean the same thing by “feline” when we
say my cat is feline and this skeleton is feline, we must be using the word “feline” in an
analogical way.33 Thus, the skeleton’s felinity is only like the felinity of the cat. So too
with God, any divinity of a proper part of God (God’s power, for example) is not really
divine in the same sense that God is divine. Thus, it would not be the case that God and a
proper part of God are divine in the same sense but achieving such predication in
different ways. Rather, the kind of “divinity” that would be predicated of each would be
different. The divinity of a proper part of God is only like the divinity of God, and not
actually the same. But, it is the assertion of this argument, that God’s creative action is

31. Craig and Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 591.
32. Dale Tuggy, “Trinity Monotheism Part 5: ‘divine,’” Trinities: Theories about Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit, 12 May 2019, https://trinities.org/blog/trinity-monotheism-part-5-divine/.
33. William Vallicella, “Is the Skeleton of a Cat Feline in the Same Sense as a Cat Is Feline?” The
Maverick Philosopher, 17 January 2013, https://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/
2013/01/is-the-skeleton-of-a-cat-feline-in-the-same-sense-a-feline-is.html.
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not grounded in something itself that does not exemplify what it means to be God. Or as
Morris notes in his work on the incarnation, any being that is divine will necessarily have
the essential divine attributes (e.g., omnipotence, omniscience).34 And if God’s creative
action is derived from something that does not possess such essential attributes, then
God’s creative action would be derived from something that is not-God. Of course, it
should be noted that I am probably stretching Craig’s point concerning divinity (which
was made in a different context) too far. Since Craig is committed to the idea that the
Triune persons do each possess the essential divine attributes, then, presumably, he
would have little interest in pushing the notion that something that does not possess such
attributes can be called “God.”35 Thus, an attempt to avoid my argument’s conclusions by
broadening our conception of divinity does not seem to be a fruitful one.
Another objection to premise 2 runs as follows: wouldn’t the force of premise 2
be undermined if one held a view of divine parts called the “Doctrine of Divine Priority”
(henceforth, DDP)?36 DDP holds that, since under Aristotelian conceptions of
composition parts tend towards the whole and are thus in some sense dependent upon the
whole, one could avoid DDS by holding that God is composed in such a way.37 However,

34. Thomas V. Morris, “The Metaphysics of God Incarnate,” in Oxford Readings in Philosophical
Theology: Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, ed. Michael Rea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),
1:214–5.
35. Craig clearly states, after all, that the Triune persons as proper parts of God are not to be
understood as proper parts in the same way that a cat skeleton is feline (Craig and Moreland, Philosophical
Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 591). However, I think that it is possible that there is more work to
be done here. It would be ideal to formulate a more precise objection to my argument here on the grounds
that divinity need not include all essential divine attributes. If such an objection can avoid plain
dubiousness, it would be very interesting to engage.
36. Gregory Fowler, “Simplicity or Priority?” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, ed.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 6:115.
37. Ibid., 115.

48

as Cohoe has pointed out, “even Aristotle, who thinks that unified wholes are, in the most
important sense, ontologically prior to their parts, also holds that there is another respect
in which they are ontologically posterior to and dependent on these parts.”38 The
important thing to note is that DDP fails to show that wholes are not dependent upon their
parts in some way.39 Furthermore, even if DDP were not problematic for the reasons
mentioned above, it would still not resolve the problem that a composite God could not
act without at least one of its parts. Even if a composite God’s parts existence depended
upon the whole, it would be inexplicable to hold that the composite God could act apart
from all of its parts. Thus, at least one part would be a necessary condition for God to act,
leaving premise 2 untarnished.
One final objection to premise 2 comes from a recent move by William Lane
Craig to reject all constitutive ontologies. Thus, rather than accept that just one reality is
simple, Craig holds that the talk of parts is not helpful in our ontology and thus rejects all
talk of parts.40 The implication of this is that all realities must be understood as simple.
The problem with this move is that it is counter-intuitive and contrary to the prima facie
appearance of parts in everyday human experience.41 While the manner in which things
may be constituted by parts may be unclear, the idea that no things are composed of parts
is too counterintuitive to accept.

38. Caleb M. Cohoe, “Why the One Cannot Have Parts: Plotinus on Divine Simplicity,
Ontological Independence, and Perfect Being Theology,” Philosophical Quarterly 67.269 (2017): 762.
39. Ibid., 763.
40. J. Brian Huffling, “A Response to William Lane Craig's Symposium Comments on Divine
Simplicity,” J. Brian Huffling, Ph. D. (blog), 17 February 2018, http://brianhuffling.com/2018/02/17/aresponse-to-william-lane-craigs-symposium-comments-on-divine-simplicity/.
41. Ibid.
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Concluding Remarks
From what has been argued within this chapter, it seems we have good reason to
hold to the second premise in the argument. A God that is composed of parts must derive
its creative action from (at least) one of its parts. But, a proper part of God is not-God in
terms of identity or predication. But, as we’ve seen from chapter 1, a God that must
derive its creative action from something that is not-God cannot create ex nihilo.
Therefore, a God composed of parts cannot create ex nihilo. Assuming that God does in
fact create ex nihilo, then the ultimate conclusion of the argument follows: God is
without proper parts. Those committed to a historically informed conception of creation
ex nihilo, then, ought to be committed to DDS. There is much more to be said, however,
as to what all is entailed by DDS. Additionally, given that DDS is certainly not without
its difficulties, it will be fruitful to address such difficulties. Thus, we must give ample
space to address these remaining issues.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SIMPLE GOD REIGNS: IMPLICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS
Introduction
Within this thesis I have argued that DDS is a necessary condition for affirming
creation ex nihilo. However, so far I have not done much in the way of addressing what
all might be entailed by DDS. Additionally, contemporary theology and philosophy is rife
with skepticism towards the doctrine. Thus, it will be useful to address some of the more
prominent objections to DDS. Within this chapter, I will begin by detailing the
metaphysical implications that follow from DDS. Second, I will address two of the more
prominent objections to DDS. Furthermore, I will offer some evidence for why a realist
metaphysical picture (similar to the sort that scholastic metaphysicians, such as Aquinas,
would have espoused) is prima facie more plausible than an extreme nominalist or
“relational” one. Third, I will show the theological import of DDS.
What is Entailed by DDS?
From what has been argued within this thesis it follows that if one is committed to
a historically informed conception of creation ex nihilo, then one ought to also be
committed to DDS. As has already been stated, DDS holds that God is not composed of
any proper parts. But what does this mean? Firstly, it precludes obvious entities that are
often cashed out in terms of parts, such as body parts. Thus, God, in the divine essence,
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must not be conceived of as being composed of material bits, like body parts.1 But what
other kinds of things could be thought of as parts? What would it even mean for an
immaterial entity to be composed of parts? At this juncture it is helpful to note the kinds
of composition that DDS often rejects. Aquinas, along with many other classical theists,
holds that Aristotelian categories such as act/potency are real forms of composition.
Thus, if act/potency is a real form of composition, and if DDS is true, then God cannot be
a composite of act and potency and must be purely actual. The same applies to
essence/existence and all other forms of composition. If we have reason for holding that
DDS is true, then we must deny that God is composed of any real form of composition.
Even despite the fact that the argument offered within this thesis has provided a route to
DDS that is different from the traditionally aseity-couched arguments for the doctrine, it
holds the same implication: one must reject all forms of real composition within God.
Now, as is probably clear to the reader at this point, this thesis has done very little
in the way of arguing for the reality of the act/potency or essence/existence distinctions.
This has been intentional. As was stated in the introduction, it has been the primary
objective of this thesis to offer an argument for DDS that does not assume a
Platonic/Aristotelian metaphysic. Despite this, there are two major implications of my
argument that lend credibility to the ontologies that are often espoused by classical
theists. First, it follows from what has been argued within this thesis that a Christian
committed to creation ex nihilo has reason to reject certain realist conceptions of divine
ideas/abstract objects. If divine ideas or abstract objects are supposed to be real entities
existing alongside God, then they would diminish God’s creative act in much the same

1. Even those proponents of DDS committed to a robust view of the hypostatic union will be
committed to the notion that the divine nature of Christ is simple.
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way that God’s creation of the world via pre-existing matter would. Additionally, if one
is committed to a realist conception of properties, for example, then God’s creative
capacities are contingent upon something that is not-God. If God’s power, for instance,
merely exemplifies some abstract entity that is itself power, then God’s creative action
presupposes something in addition to God! Thus, it seems that one conclusion of the
argument within this thesis is that it weakens realist positions that are committed to
divine ideas or abstract objects as real entities that are distinct from God. What is left,
then, of the major metaphysical positions is a nominalist position and classical theism.
A second implication of the argument offered within this thesis is that it sets the
proverbial table for those who do hold to classical theism and Aristotelian/Platonic
metaphysical commitments to show why such ontologies are to be favored over
nominalist ones. This is because those who deny DDS, if they are to remain theists,
would, presumably, deny the real distinctions of act/potency, essence/existence, and the
like. For it would seem to follow that if act/potency or essence/existence is a real form of
composition, and if God exists, then one would have reason to deny that God is
composed in such a way in light of God’s aseity (as is traditionally argued) or (from what
has been argued here) a commitment to a traditional conception of creation ex nihilo.
Thus, rather than sacrificing many traditional divine attributes or doctrines (i.e., creation
ex nihilo), the more modest metaphysical option would be to simply deny that the forms
of composition espoused by thinkers such as Aquinas are real forms of composition.2 The
primary task of the classical theist, then, is to argue why, in fact, there is good reason to

2. This is ultimately what is done by thinkers such as William Lane Craig who hold that God is, in
fact, simple but, consequently, so is everything else.
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believe that the distinctions of act/potency or essence/existence entail real forms of
composition. So while it is not the primary task of this thesis to argue that act/potency or
essence/existence are real distinctions, this thesis does lay the groundwork for proponents
of Neoplatonic/Aristotelian ontologies to make such a case.3
What I have argued in this thesis, then, has not been to make a case for a fullfledged doctrine of DDS as was espoused by Aquinas, for example, but rather to argue
primarily that any view of God as composed of proper parts ought to be rejected. Of
course, as the reader might infer, I think that when confronted with a dichotomy between
the realism of Aquinas’s ontology and extreme nominalism, I believe we have good
reason to reject nominalism and, hence, accept something like an Aristotelian/
Neoplatonic metaphysic along with a classical conception of God. But, even if we have
good reason to hold to an Aristotelian or Neoplatonic metaphysic, a conception of God as
simple under such a view is not without its problems.
In order to understand some of the notorious problems associated with DDS, we
must first understand what follows from a conception of God that is absolutely simple
under an Aristotelian framework. First, as has already been noted, if act/potency or
essence/existence entails a real form of composition and if God is simple, then God
cannot be composed of act/potency or essence/existence. Thus, God must be purely
actual or existence itself. While, on its face, the assertion of God’s pure actuality or
God’s being subsistent existence itself might not seem that problematic, it is what such a
view entails that causes potential troubles. First, allow me to offer what I think to be the

3. Later, I will (1) lay out a brief case against what Wolterstorff has called “constituent ontologies”
broadly and (2) argue why there is prima facie reason to hold that act/potency and essence/existence are
real forms of composition.

54

less controversial implications of DDS under an Aristotelian metaphysical framework.
DDS entails that God is a se; that is, God exists independently of everything else. At least
some conception of divine aseity seems to be important for most theists; thus, this seems
to be (relatively) noncontroversial. Additionally, a conception of DDS informed by
Aristotelian metaphysics will entail the doctrine of divine immutability. This is because,
if God is capable of change and act/potency is a real form of composition, then God’s
changing would introduce potency into the divine life. Even those who would deny a
Boethian or Thomistic conception of divine immutability would still hold that God is
immutable in some sense. Furthermore, DDS that is informed by an Aristotelian
metaphysic will entail a strong doctrine of divine impassibility. Despite the heavy recent
criticism of the doctrine of divine impassibility, it seems to be undergoing something of a
resurgence.4 Thus, I take the doctrines of aseity, immutability, and impassibility that are
implied by DDS to be the less controversial implications of the doctrine.
As far as what I take to be the more controversial implications of the doctrine,
there are a few key implications to be summarized here. First, by asserting that God’s
essence is identical to God’s existence, what follows is a denial that God is, in any way,
composed of accidental (or non-essential) properties. Second, if God is wholly
noncomposite, then God’s attributes cannot be something distinct from God.
Furthermore, if one is informed by Aristotelian or Platonic ontologies, then one does not
have the luxury of merely stating that God’s attributes are useful fictions. One must take

4. For example, see Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God, Oxford Early
Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Thomas Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000).
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the more extreme route of holding that God is identical to God’s attributes.5 In particular,
these two implications have caused the greatest degree of headache in the minds of both
the detractors and proponents of DDS. Corresponding to each of these two troublesome
implications of DDS are two notorious objections to DDS. First, there is Alvin
Plantinga’s critique of DDS offered within his lecture, Does God Have a Nature?
Second, in its most recent iteration, is what has come to be known as the “modal
collapse” objection. This objection’s most outspoken recent proponent is R.T. Mullins.
Allow me to address each of these objections in turn.
Contemporary Challenges to DDS
Alvin Plantinga’s 1980 Aquinas lecture Does God Have a Nature? drew attention
to one of the more problematic aspects of DDS. In particular, Plantinga takes issue with
the fact that DDS (particularly Aquinas’s conception of the doctrine) entails that God is
identical with God’s attributes.6 For Plantinga, if one is committed to the idea that God
must be identical with his properties (which, if one is a proponent of DDS and a realist
about properties, then they must hold this), then one must hold that God has exactly one
property.7 Worse still, in fact, God must simply be a property!8 As Plantinga notes, there
are several problems with this implication. First, if God is a property, then God cannot be
a person; God cannot create the world.9 Additionally, if God has or is one property, then
5. Christians within the tradition were well aware of this implication. See, for example, Augustine,
City of God, 11.10.
6. Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature: The Aquinas Lecture, 1980 (Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press, 1980), 37–8.
7. Ibid., 57.
8. Ibid., 57.
9. Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature, 47, 57. Properties do not create the world; persons do.
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this seems to run directly contrary to the (seemingly obvious) view that God has multiple
properties.10 But how then ought a proponent of DDS escape Plantinga’s two challenges?
While there have been many sound responses to Plantinga’s critique in the
decades since he initially issued it, allow me to briefly sketch some of the better
responses to Plantinga’s objection and then offer the line of reasoning that I see to be
most convincing. It seems that one of the major veins of responses to Plantinga’s lecture
is to criticize the subtle Platonism informing his conception of properties. Leftow, in
describing Augustine’s position on the matter, notes that Augustine’s identification of
God with the forms is not a move to render God an abstract object but, instead, to
eliminate the explanatory power of the forms while bolstering God’s supremacy.11 Thus,
under Augustine’s view, God does the explanatory grounding that once was reserved for
the forms. Furthermore, in responding to the recent criticisms of divine simplicity,
Graham Oppy notes that objections such as Plantinga’s assume that for every property
there must be a real object that exemplifies that property.12 But, according to Oppy, such
an account of properties need not apply to God. Rather than just some constituent
part/aspect of God exemplifying some corresponding property, it could be God himself
that grounds the truth of properties of God.13 Following this move, Brower advances his
notion of a “truthmaker” account of DDS.14 For Brower, in a similar trajectory as Oppy,
10. Ibid., 47.
11. Brian Leftow, “Divine Simplicity,” Faith and Philosophy 23.4 (2006): 366–7.
12. As referenced within: James E. Dolezal, God without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the
Metaphysics of God’s Absoluteness (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2011), 158.
13. Ibid., 158.
14. Jeffrey E. Brower, “Making Sense of Divine Simplicity,” Faith and Philosophy 25.1 (2008):
19.
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God and God alone is what renders the predications of God true. While I find responses
such as these to be appealing, there are alternative responses to objections like
Plantinga’s that more effectively illustrate the problem with Plantinga’s critique.
One of Plantinga’s chief problems with DDS is that it fails to properly reconcile
itself with God’s exemplification of a plurality of properties. But what if, as I have
already noted is present in Leftow, Oppy, and Brower, the problem with Plantinga’s
critique is his conception of properties? What if the kind of properties that Plantinga
would have God exemplify are not the kind of predicates that God could exemplify?
Michelle Panchuk theorizes that to exemplify a property necessitates finitude. Panchuk
notes that
to exemplify a property is to exist in a certain way. It is to exist in this way, rather
than in that way. In other words, to exemplify a property is to be delimited and
finite. For this wine to be red, it must not be (in the same way and at the same
time) any of the other colors of the rainbow. To be a dog is to fail to be a cat and
all of the other animals at the zoo. Furthermore, being an instance of a particular
kind-universal and exemplifying one property may limit the range of properties
that a particular can exemplify. Being an instance of the universal-kind dog means
that the particular cannot exemplify the property of being prime. Properties
impose a specific set of limits on particulars.15 [emphasis original]
Thus, to possess a property would necessitate limitations. But God is not limited;
therefore, God cannot be understood to possess properties. This is similar to the
conclusion reached by Barry Miller in his work, A Most Unlikely God. Miller argues that
the properties of a thing constitute the bounds which demarcate the manner and extent of
existence it has.16 In much the same way that lines on a polygon clearly demarcate the
15. Michelle Panchuk, “The Simplicity of Divine Ideas” (unpublished paper), 16,
https://www.academia.edu/30372564/The_Simplicity_of_Divine_Ideas, 9.
16. Barry Miller, A Most Unlikely God: A Philosophical Enquiry (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1996), 121. Miller’s concept of bound, of course, is used to demonstrate how existence
can be a predicate. It must be noted that I have no intention to exhaustively defend the notion that existence
is a predicate within this thesis.
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area covered by the polygon, so too do properties demonstrate the different ways in
which a given creature is finite or limited. Thus, since God is not limited in any way, God
does not exemplify properties.
But does the implication of such an account of properties as limits/bounds of a
thing’s existence entail that we cannot predicate anything of God? Panchuk and Miller
give similar answers. Panchuk notes that rather than diminishing the character of God,
the denial of properties in God, gives God a far richer character than that of finite
creatures. Since God is limitless, God encompasses all of the predicates of finite creatures
but without the limitations that they possess.17 Panchuk uses the illustration of an
infinitely long line. Sure, an infinitely long line might fail to exemplify the property of
being “an inch long,” but this is not because it is limited but because it far surpasses such
a property in terms of length.18 Additionally, for Miller, since God is boundless existence,
the predicates that creatures exemplify apply to God, not in a limited way, but in the
greatest possible way.19 This is because, for Miller, God is the limit of all sets of
properties. But God is not a limit simpliciter; rather, God is to be understood as a limit
case.20 A limit case is an absolute limit of a series and not merely what happens to be the
limit of a series.21 Thus, since God is utterly boundless, all predicates must apply to God
as a limit case. In other words, God is not the most powerful being, for example, because

17. Panchuk, “The Simplicity of Divine Ideas,” 10.
18. Ibid., 10.
19. Miller, A Most Unlikely God, 121.
20. Ibid., 12.
21. Miller, A Most Unlikely God, 10.
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God just so happens to be the most powerful being but, rather, because God’s power is
such that it is the very limit case of the predicate/property of power.22 As should be
obvious from both Panchuk’s and Miller’s accounts, simply because properties do not
apply to God does not entail that we cannot predicate things of God. Rather, what follows
from such accounts is that if one’s conceptions of properties is one that necessitates that
properties are limiting concepts, then God cannot exemplify properties in that way. Thus,
we can still, in good faith, predicate goodness, love, and power, of God. It must be
understood, however, that God possesses such predicates in an infinite way. By virtue of
being infinite, the divine essence encompasses, to the maximal degree, all predicates that
may be applied to it.
Thus, contra Plantinga, God does not exemplify properties because properties
necessitate finitude. Additionally, if God is limitless, then each of the predicates that
would be attributed to the divine nature must be infinite and not finite. In other words, the
predicates that God has must not be limited in any way. This entails that such predicates
must coalesce in God. This is because, if there are hard and fast distinctions between
divine predicates, then God possesses them in a limited way. Since God does not possess
such predicates in a limited way, then in the divine essence predicates must coalesce. Or,
as Nash-Marshall puts the matter in making a similar point, “What would it mean to
claim that there is a sense in which God is not just? It would mean that his mercy is not
just, that his omnipotence is not just, that his power is not just. This is not just a terrifying
claim; it seems to be an absurd one. How can God truly be just if His power is not just, if

22. We can begin to see the makings of an implicit argument for an analogical notion of
predication when it comes to God. Miller makes this argument explicit within his A Most Unlikely God.
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his mercy is not just, if his omnipotence is not just?”23 For Nash-Marshall, predicates of
God are not merely properties, but characteristics of God referring to the whole of God.24
Predicates must be understood to coalesce within God’s self, then.
But how can this proposal be understood to be coherent? How can two predicates
of God (such as goodness and power, for example) be identical? As has already been
implied, properties, insofar as they are delimited, cannot coherently be identified with
each other. However, if, to use Miller’s language, predicates have a limit case, then God
possesses such predicates as a limit case does to a set. In other words, predicates do not
apply to God in a limited way. As a result, we have reason for affirming what has already
been stated: predicates must coalesce within God’s self. But, if this is the case, then the
concern about the coherence of identifying distinct predicates with one another is only
troublesome if we speak about properties. Since God does not possess predicates as
properties, which are necessarily delimiting, the concern with coherence dissolves. If, in
response to God’s unlimited nature, one presses how properties can coherently coalesce,
this still presupposes that God possesses properties. We need not share Plantinga’s worry
about DDS reducing God to a property because God simply does not have properties.
Additionally, this does not diminish the divine nature any more than a limit case is
diminished by the set it limits. We can still truthfully and robustly describe the attributes

23. Siobhan Nash-Marshall, “Properties, Conflation, and Divine Simplicity,” The Saint Anselm
Journal 4.2 (2007): 15.
24. Ibid., 14.
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of the divine essence.25 Thus, Plantinga’s objections to DDS are not without plausible
solutions.
A second major objection to DDS concerns a problem with God’s contingent
acts/knowledge of creation. One of the most recent forms of this objection comes from
R.T. Mullins and has been dubbed the “modal collapse” objection to DDS. Essentially,
the objection runs as follows: under DDS God’s essence is God’s existence. An
implication of this is that God is pure act and, as such, God’s essence must be identical to
God’s actions.26 But, if God is identical with his action, then God must be identical with
his creative action.27 Since God is necessarily existent, then God’s act of creation must
necessarily exist. Thus, the creation of this particular world is no longer contingent and
breaks down, or “collapses,” into absolute necessity.28 This would result in holding that
the only possible world that could have been created is, in fact, the actual world. Thus,
according to Mullins, DDS seems to imply a modal collapse.
What are the potential solutions to this objection? A popular Thomistic response
to the threat of modal collapse is to invoke what Aquinas called, “suppositional
necessity.”29 Aquinas draws a distinction between something’s being absolutely
necessary (necessary in and of itself), and something’s being suppositionally necessary

25. Stump, in echoing Aquinas, notes that this does not entail that all of the predicates of God are
synonymous. Rather, the predicates of the divine essence differ in sense but not in reference. See, Eleonore
Stump, Aquinas, Arguments of the Philosophers (New York: Routledge, 2003), 99.
26. Ryan T. Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016), 138.
27. Ibid., 138.
28. Ibid., 138.
29. Matthew Levering, Engaging the Doctrine of Creation: Cosmos, Creatures, and the Wise and
Good Creator (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017), 103.
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(necessary through another).30 Aquinas notes that since God is immutable (i.e., incapable
of changing), then what God wills will necessarily take place.31 But, the sort of necessity
that entails that what God wills will come to pass is not an absolute necessity, but a
suppositional instance of necessity. In illustrating what suppositional necessity is,
Aquinas uses the example of Socrates sitting. Supposing that Socrates is sitting; then,
necessarily, Socrates is sitting.32 But it would be wrongheaded to posit that Socrates’
sitting is out of absolute necessity. Thus, Socrates’ sitting is an instance of suppositional
necessity. In the same way, that God immutably wills contingent truths to come to pass
does entail a sort of necessity (i.e., suppositional necessity), just not absolute necessity.
The necessity of the creation of the world, for example, is only necessary on the
supposition that God has immutably willed such creation.
Mullins, however, is not impressed with such responses to the modal collapse
objection. Mullins rightly summarizes that the proponent of DDS who argues that God’s
act of creation is suppositionally necessary will also hold that God’s essence is absolutely
necessary.33 But, argues Mullins, if the proponent of DDS affirms the (plainly true)
distinction between absolute and suppositional necessity, then God’s act of creation
cannot be identical to God’s essence! But the tenet that God’s single act (which would
include creation) is identical with God’s essence seems to be a mainstay of classical
theism. Thus, since the proponent of DDS will not give up the notion that God’s essence

30. Levering, Engaging the Doctrine of Creation, 103.
31. ST I.19.3.
32. Ibid.
33. Mullins, The End of the Timeless God, 138.
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is identical with God’s act of creation, and since the proponent of DDS will also not
reject the obvious distinction between suppositional and absolute necessity, then they are
left with two options. Either the proponent of DDS can deny that God’s essence is
absolutely necessary or they can deny that God’s creation of the world is suppositionally
necessary. For Mullins, the solution is simple: simply (no pun intended) deny that God’s
essence is identical with God’s act of creation. But, argues Mullins, since proponents of
DDS will not deny such a distinction, they must commit themselves to a modal collapse.
God’s creation of the world is logically necessary and this world becomes the only
possible world.
Are proponents of DDS, then, left to merely bite the bullet and accept the
consequences of modal collapse? While some classical theists have, at least implicitly,
taken this approach, there is reason to suspect that the dichotomy between God’s essence
being identical with his act of creation and modal collapse is a false one. Recent work by
Christopher Tomaszewski indicates that the flaw in Mullins’s conception of the modal
collapse argument is that it is invalid on the grounds that it invalidly substitutes into a
modal context. 34 Tomaszewski, in referencing Quine, notes that, “modal contexts are
referentially opaque, which means that substitution into them does not generally preserve
the truth of the sentence into which such a substitution has been made.”35 In echoing
Quine’s own example, Tomaszewski notes that simply because (1) 8 is necessarily
greater than 7, and (2) the number of planets is 8, it would be invalid to infer (3) that the

34. Christopher Tomaszewski, “Collapsing the Modal Collapse Argument: On an Invalid
Argument against Divine Simplicity,” Analysis 79.2 (2019): 280.
35. Ibid., 280.
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number of planets is necessarily greater than 7.36 The modal collapse argument commits
a similar fallacy by arguing (1) necessarily, God exists, (2) God is identical with God’s
act of creation, to (3) necessarily, God’s act of creation exists.37 The problem,
Tomaszewski notes, is that the necessity of God’s act of creation only follows from the
premises offered if God is necessarily identical to God’s act of creation.38 But since this
is different from the original second premise, and since most proponents of DDS are not
committed to God’s being necessarily identical to God’s creative action, proponents of
DDS are under no obligation to accept the modified version of premise 2.39 All that
proponents of DDS are traditionally committed to is that God is identical with his act of
creation, not that God is necessarily identical to his act of creation.40 So a problem with
modal collapse objections is that they are unclear as to, in what sense, God is identical
with God’s act of creation.
A further example of a proponent of DDS who takes issue with the sense in which
Mullins identifies God with his act of creation comes from the work of Dwight Stanislaw.
Within his thesis, Stanislaw notes that Mullins’ modal collapse objection is too vague as
to how it is that God is identical with God’s act of creation. As a result, it
mischaracterizes the classical theist’s position. Stanislaw mentions three possibilities for
what “God’s act of creation” could mean. First, it could refer to the “principle whereby”

36. Tomaszewski, Collapsing the Modal Collapse Argument, 280.
37. Ibid., 280.
38. Ibid., 281.
39. Ibid., 281.
40. Ibid., 280.
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God creates (i.e., God in and of himself).41 Second, it could refer merely to the effect of
what God creates.42 Or, third, it could refer to the whole event involving the creator and
what is created.43 But, as Stanislaw points out, the modal collapse objection only works if
one is committed to the second or third definitions of “God’s act of creation” as being
necessarily true of God.44 But proponents of DDS do not (generally) hold such a position
and, as such, need not worry about the threat of modal collapse.
Feser and Miller have also highlighted that DDS need not entail that God holds all
of the same properties from possible world to possible world. But the modal collapse
objection seems to rely on the misconception that God must hold all of the same
properties in every possible world. Many proponents of DDS have held that while God’s
intrinsic properties are identical from one possible world to the next, God’s extrinsic
properties need not remain the same. In other words, not all predicates of the divine
nature need to remain the same from possible world to possible world. God can possess
contingent properties so long as such properties do not really apply to God.45 Feser and
Miller note that God can possess what Peter Geach called “Cambridge properties.”46 A
Cambridge property is a property that implies a change in extrinsic relation and not a real

41. Dwight Stanislaw, “De Artifice Divino: A Thomistic Account of God’s Creative Act” (MA
thesis, Holy Apostles College and Seminary, 2019), 47.
42. Ibid., 47.
43. Ibid., 47.
44. Ibid., 48.
45. Edward Feser, Five Proofs of the Existence of God (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2017), 196..
It should be noted that at this stage I, like Feser, am merely using the language of “properties” in reference
to God heuristically.
46. Ibid., 196.
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change within an entity.47 Feser remarks that if Socrates becomes shorter than Plato in
virtue of Plato growing taller than Socrates, then this does not entail any real change
within Socrates, but merely a Cambridge change. Socrates remains the same, but his
relation to entities external to him has changed. So too with God. God’s creation of the
world can be a contingent “property” of God by virtue of being a Cambridge property
and not a real/essential property. God’s creation of the world need not be thought of as a
property that God must essentially possess. Thus, because God’s being the creator of the
world is not a necessary attribute of God, the proponent of DDS has reason to reject the
modal collapse objection. Within each of these responses, we can see that proponents of
DDS reject the attempt to hold that God’s creation of the world is necessary. In fact, the
modal collapse objection presumes a sense of identity between God and God’s act of
creation that proponents of DDS do not hold. While there are ample more responses to
this objection, what has been said here will suffice for our purposes.
Having addressed two of the most prominent objections to DDS, allow me to
make a note about the metaphysical systems that often lie at the heart of DDS. Opponents
of DDS can still avoid DDS by denying the very metaphysical systems that would entail
a robust definition of DDS such as Aquinas’s, for example. It is possible that one can, as
William Lane Craig does, resist DDS by claiming that parts are not real features of the
world. This, however, as has already been noted, seems to be too extreme a move. Simply
because parts are not always easy to define does not entail that we have good reason to
reject all talk of parts. Additionally, the rejection of any real parts seems to be too
counter-intuitive a conclusion to accept. However, there are other, more plausible, ways

47. Feser, Five Proofs of the Existence of God, 196.
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to avoid DDS by adopting another metaphysical system. Wolterstorff, for example,
suggests rejecting a constitutive ontology (an ontology which views properties as parts of
the entity they describe) in favor of a relational ontology.48 In a relational ontology,
properties are in relationship to the entity they describe in virtue of said entity
exemplifying those properties.49 If one holds to a relational ontology, then one would
have grounds for rejecting DDS (at least in its Thomistic form). While it is beyond the
scope of this thesis to offer a full-throated defense of a constitutive ontology, it should be
noted that there is ample reason to be skeptical of relational ontologies. In particular, a
constitutive ontology offers a simpler ontology than a relational one. William Valicella
argues that to exemplify a certain property, a thing must have a certain internal relation.50
In other words, for a thing to exemplify redness it must simply be red.51 After all it would
make no sense for an object to exemplify redness without being red! Thus, for Vallicella,
exemplification must refer to an internal relation, “one that supervenes on the intrinsic
properties of its relata.”52 A thing’s being red, then, is what grounds its exemplification of
redness. But, as Vallicella argues, the supposed allure of relational ontologies is that they
hold that a thing’s having a certain property is grounded in the exemplification relation to
an extrinsic universal and not that thing’s intrinsic makeup.53 But if a thing’s having a
certain property must be grounded in its intrinsic makeup, then to posit that it must also
48. See, Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Divine Simplicity,” Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 531-52.
49. Ibid., 547–8.
50. William Vallicella, A Paradigm Theory of Existence: Onto-Theology Vindicated,
Philosophical Studies Series 89 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 172.
51. Ibid., 172.
52. Ibid., 172.
53. Ibid., 172.
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exemplify some extrinsic universal is superfluous. The explanatory power of relational
ontologies then is lacking and unnecessarily expands one’s ontology. Constitutive
ontologies, then, seem to be simpler than relational ones (no pun intended).
Lastly, despite the focus of this thesis being on making a case for why God must
be totally non-composite and leaving it to other proponents of DDS to argue in detail as
to why act/potency and essence/existence are real forms of composition that God, by
extension, would lack, I think we have prima facie reasons for holding act/potency and
essence/existence to be real forms of composition. Regarding act/potency: while one is
free to deny that act/potency is a real form of composition, it seems that one would do so
at the risk of being forced to accept that the word is in Heraclitian flux or that it is
without change as with Parmenides' static ontology. It is clear, after all, that things are
actual. Things such as tables, frogs, and people are real. But are those same actual things
capable of undergoing change while remaining the same beings? It is, at least putatively,
the case that things can undergo change. Things could potentially be different. But does
such potentiality entail a real form of composition between act/potency intrinsic to things
that can change? If a thing can be changed, then this necessitates that that thing can be
different than it is before it is changed. The “difference” must be intrinsic to the thing that
is being changed, otherwise the change in question would merely be a “Cambridge”
change.54 But if this is the case, then potentiality seems to supervene on the intrinsic
capacities and makeup of a thing.55 Thus, since act and potency are distinct, and since we

54. Feser, Five Proofs of the Existence of God, 196.
55. This argument takes some inspiration from Vallicella’s comments on relational ontologies.
Valicella, A Paradigm Theory of Existence, 172.
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have reason to hold that potencies are intrinsic to things that can change, then act and
potency are real forms of composition. If this is the case, then in light of my argument,
God cannot be composed of act and potency and must, therefore, be purely actual.56
Thus, we have prima facie reason to hold that act and potency are real forms of
composition.
Alternatively, we also have prima facie reason to hold that essence/existence is a
real distinction within creatures. Let it be presupposed, for the sake of time, that essences
are, in fact, real.57 When I describe the nature of a horse, for example, I am describing a
real thing. The nature of a horse is not just a useful fiction, there really are things that
exemplify horse-nature, so to speak. But if existence was not distinct from essence, then
in whatever possible world the essence of a thing was, its existence would be also.58 But
there are possible worlds in which we can have access to the essence of a thing that does
not exist (e.g., we can conceive of the essence of a unicorn in this world).59 However, if
there was no real distinction between essence and existence, then everything with an
essence would be necessarily existent (lions, and tigers, and bears!).60 Since this is not the
case, we have prima facie reason to hold that essence/existence is a real distinction within

56. There are far more extensive and effective defenses of the act/potency distinction elsewhere.
See, for example, Feser, Five Proofs of the Existence of God, 17–68.
57. There are rigorous defenses of essentialism elsewhere. See, David S. Oderberg, Real
Essentialism, Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy 11 (New York: Routledge, 2007).
58. Feser, Five Proofs of the Existence of God, 119.
59. Ibid., 118.
60. Ibid., 119.
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things. If this is so, then God cannot be composed of essence/existence and must be, as
Aquinas calls God, ipsum esse subsistens.61
From what has been argued here, one can see that even the most forceful
objections to DDS are not without plausible solutions. Additionally, attempts to reject the
metaphysical systems that so often inform robust conceptions of DDS are not without
their consequences. And while this thesis has not extensively argued for the forms of
composition that are often entailed by, say, Scholastic proponents of DDS, it has been
shown that we have prima facie reason to hold that such forms of composition are real
forms of composition. If this is the case, then a robust conception of DDS (of the sort that
Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas would have espoused) is back on the metaphysical table
and we have been able to argue to such a conception using non-traditional means.
Theological Implications of DDS
Having offered an argument for DDS on the basis of creation ex nihilo, defended
the doctrine against recent objections, and shown why we have prima facie reason to hold
that God is simple in the manner that classical theists have held God to be, let me address
some theological implications of this doctrine. First, since my argument was primarily
concerned with creation ex nihilo, allow me to tease out what is entailed for a doctrine of
creation in light of creation ex nihilo. What lies at the heart of the creation event is not
some universal, or attribute, or abstract object, or even an impersonal bit of divinity, but
rather, the personal God in all of his glory. The only ground for the world’s creation is the
all-perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent deity. Additionally, God’s
capacity to create the world is not derived from something that is not-God and God’s

61. ST 1. 4. 2.
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willing of the creation of the world mustn’t be conditioned by some prior entity. God’s
creation of the world, then, must be understood to be an utterly free and sovereign act.62
God must be free in the greatest possible sense and without constraint.
Additionally, a robust conception of DDS, as has been offered here, does not
contradict other necessary doctrines within the Christian faith. As was discussed more
thoroughly in chapter 3, DDS does not run contrary to a traditionally Nicene
understanding of the Trinity. The Triune persons ought not to be thought of as proper
parts of God (in fact, positing as much poses its own problems). Thus, DDS does not
undermine traditional conceptions of Trinitarianism.
Moreover, while little has been said of the incarnation thus far (seeing as it is
largely beyond the scope of this thesis), I would be remiss not to say something about the
implications of DDS for the doctrine. DDS and the doctrine of the incarnation have often
been seen to be in tension with one another. Allow me to briefly address a few concerns.
First, how does an immutable God (which is entailed by DDS) “become” incarnate in a
human person? Second, if DDS is true, how can we ascribe divinity to Christ? Or, more
seriously, how can we ascribe the contingent properties of Christ (his human attributes) to
his divinity? Each of these questions can be resolved without posing any real threat to
DDS. In response to the first question, it should be noted that the kind of change that the
incarnation involves in relation to the divine nature is a Cambridge change. After all, as

62. While, of course, this may raise questions of the compatibility with God’s immutability and
divine action, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer a thorough response to such an objection here.
However, it should be noted that, as Stump argues, it is plausible that a single action might produce a
plurality of effects. Stump uses the illustration of how turning on a switch might initiate a number of
different effects. But God’s act must be one and eternal, under DDS. Thus, God’s single act (which is his
willing from eternity) can produce a plurality of effects. This presents a difficulty since willing something
seems to imply a disposition. Regarding the difficulty of God’s willing a plurality of different events,
Stump notes how God’s willing of contingent truths must be grounded in his willing of himself. See,
Stump, Aquinas, 99.
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was decided at the council of Chalcedon, the incarnation does not cause a change to the
divine nature.63 Regarding the second concern, if divinity is a predicate, then Jesus Christ
must exemplify divinity. Tom V. Morris notes that Christ can exemplify the essential
divine attributes without ceasing to be human.64 While lacking the divine attributes might
be a limitation common to all humans other than the incarnate Christ, we need not think
that such a limitation is a universal property.65 Thus, as Morris notes, Christ incarnate is
fully human (exemplifying all of the necessary attributes of humanity) without being
merely human (exemplifying common limiting and accidental attributes of humanity).66
And, lastly, regarding the third objection, while the communicatio idiomatum guarantees
that what can be predicated of Christ’s human nature can be predicated to the whole
person of Christ, this applies uniquely to the incarnation. In describing Cyril of
Alexandria’s predication of human attributes (such as suffering and weeping) to Christ,
Gavrilyuk writes, “according to Cyril, the statements ‘God wept’ or ‘God was crucified’
were theologically legitimate, as long as it was added that the subject was God-in-theflesh, and not God outside of the framework of the incarnation.”67 Thus, the kinds of
contingent properties that one finds in the incarnation can be predicated, not to the divine
essence, but to God in the context of the incarnation. This, similar to the problem of
immutability and the incarnation, entails that the predication of human attributes to God

63. Everett Ferguson, From Christ to the Pre-Reformation, vol. 1 of Church History: The Rise and
Growth of the Church in Its Cultural, Intellectual, and Political Context (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2005),
264.
64. Thomas V. Morris, “Understanding God Incarnate,” AsTJ 33.2 (1988): 66.
65. Ibid., 66.
66. Ibid., 66.
67. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God, 156.
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in the incarnation ought to be understood as (something at least like) Cambridge
properties. Thus the doctrine of the incarnation can plausibly be reconciled with DDS.
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have explored the implications of and objections to DDS. While
it is true that my argument has not primarily been concerned with arguing for the real
distinctions that are often entailed by DDS (e.g., essence/existence), my argument does
pave the way for such arguments to be made. Additionally, we have prima facie
compelling reasons for holding that it is plausible that essence/existence or act/potency
are real distinctions. Because my argument has shown that God must lack all forms of
composition, then if such distinctions are real distinctions, God must not be composed of
them. Thus, the only way to avoid a conception of DDS similar to thinkers like Aquinas
is to embrace nominalism. Additionally, I examined two popular objections to DDS from
Alvin Plantinga and R. T. Mullins. At its root, Plantinga’s critique of DDS makes
assumptions about the nature of properties that proponents of DDS simply do not share.
Additionally, Mullins’ objection, in particular, faces problems with its validity and does
not accurately represent the way in which proponents of DDS would hold that God is
identical to God’s act of creation. I then offered some thoughts on the theological
ramifications of DDS in general, and in particular, addressed the apparent tensions
between DDS and the doctrine of the incarnation. Despite the challenges that a robust
account of DDS faces, the metaphysical assumptions underpinning it enjoy prima facie
plausibility and the objections to it are not without reasonable responses.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Summary
My chief claim in this thesis has been that the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity is a
necessary condition for affirming creation ex nihilo. My argument rested on two
premises. First, if God’s creative actions must be derived from something that is not-God,
then God cannot create ex nihilo. This was demonstrated by two lines of argumentation.
On the one hand, a historically informed conception of creation ex nihilo holds that God
does not make use of what I have called non-divine means in his creation of the world. A
means is merely a ground that must be actively employed by an agent to perform some
action. I then showed that there is a strong vein of witnesses within the Christian tradition
which hold to a conception of creation ex nihilo that entails (at least de facto) that God
does not make use of non-divine means in his creation of the world. Additionally, via
conceptual analysis, I argued that what is problematic about God’s use of non-divine
means is precisely their lack of divinity. On the other hand, if God’s creative action must
be grounded in something that is not-God, then God must make use of non-divine means
to create the world. This is because given that God is omniscient, sovereign, and free,
God must actively employ all grounds that are relevant to his act of creation. From these
two reasons, it follows that if God’s creative actions must be derived from something that
is not-God, then God cannot create ex nihilo.
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Second, I argued that a God composed of parts must derive its creative action
from something that is not-God. This is because a composite entity cannot act wholly
independently of its parts. Thus, a God that is composed of parts must derive its creative
action from (at least) one of its parts. But, a proper part of God is not-God in terms of
identity or predication. And since a God that must derive its creative action from
something that is not-God cannot create ex nihilo, a God composed of parts cannot create
ex nihilo. As a result, DDS becomes a necessary condition for one to affirm creation ex
nihilo.
I then explored the implications of and objections to DDS. While the primary
focus of my thesis was not to argue for the real distinctions affirmed by classical theists
(e.g., act/potency), my argument does entail that God must not possess any real proper
parts. I then argued that unless one goes to the nominalist extreme of denying all forms of
constitution, then we are likely left with a conception of DDS that is similar to that
espoused by thinkers such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas. Additionally, we have
prima facie reasons to hold that the classical distinctions of act/potency and
essence/existence are real distinctions. In light of my argument, then, God must be devoid
of such distinctions. Thus, assuming that extreme forms of nominalism are not an option,
my argument seems to entail that a classical variation of DDS is true.
Areas for Additional Research
Within the fourth chapter of this thesis, I indicated that my argument essentially
tries to eliminate any middle position between nominalism and realism couched in a
robust conception of DDS (as is found in, say, Aquinas). This is because conceptions of
God as composite and/or realist conceptions of properties, divine ideas, and abstract
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objects all pose the same problem for creation ex nihilo: They entail that God’s creative
action must be derived from something that is not-God. The only tenable positions for
one seeking to maintain a historically informed conception of creation ex nihilo, then,
become nominalism (and a rejection of all constituent ontologies) or DDS. Because this
was the thrust of my argument, I did not offer any exhaustive arguments against
nominalism or for an Aristotelian/Neoplatonic metaphysic.1 As a result, future
developments of this work would likely be bolstered by an exhaustive treatment of
nominalism, on the one hand, and an argument for Aristotelian distinctions (such as
act/potency), on the other. Despite the work left to be done, from what has been argued
within this thesis, one can see that DDS can be reasonably defended from basic Christian
commitments (i.e., creation ex nihilo). It is not necessary to conceive of DDS as a merely
Greek doctrine inferred from sources outside of what God has revealed. Rather, God’s
simplicity follows from the most basic of Christian commitments: It is God who creates,
sustains, and rules over the cosmos. The Doctrine of Divine Simplicity ultimately entails
that the personal God is at the foundation of all reality and not, say, some abstract object
or property.

1. This is partly to do with the fact that, from the outset, I have tried to limit the amount of
operative metaphysical assumptions within this thesis.
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